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Introduction	  
When	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms,	  1982	  (hereinafter	  “Charter”)1	  was	  first	  adopted,	  
its	   potential	   impact	   on	   the	   balance	   between	   individual	   and	   collective	   rights	   in	   Canada	   was	   much	  
debated.	   Although	   some	   authors	   contended	   that	   the	   Charter	   was	   mostly	   a	   vehicle	   for	   liberal	  
individualism,2	  others	   thought	   that	   it	   retained	   elements	   of	   communitarianism.3	  Quebec	   had	   precisely	  
*The	  author	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Christopher	  Manfredi,	  Francesca	  Taddeo	  and	  Benoît	  Pelletier,	  as	  well	  as
anonymous	  reviewers	  for	  their	  comments	  on	  previous	  drafts	  of	  this	  article.	  
1Part	  I	  of	  the	  Constitution	  Act,	  1982,	  being	  Schedule	  B	  to	  the	  Canada	  Act	  1982	  (UK),	  1982,	  c.	  11	  [Charter].	  
2See	  e.g.	  Allan	  C	  Cairns,	  “Constitutional	  Change	  and	  the	  Three	  Equalities”	  in	  Ronald	  L.	  Watts	  &	  Douglas	  M.	  Brown,	  
eds,	  Options	  for	  a	  New	  Canada	  (Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  1991)	  77;	  Michael	  Mandel,	  The	  Charter	  of	  
Rights	  and	  the	  Legalization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Canada(Toronto:	  Thompson	  Educational	  Publishing,	  1994).	  
2	  
refused	  to	  ratify	  it,	  since	  it	  not	  only	  failed	  to	  recognize	  the	  province’s	  “distinct”	  or	  “national”	  character,	  
but	  it	  also	  severely	  reduced	  Quebec’s	  power	  to	  legislate	  in	  the	  area	  of	  language	  policy,	  which	  would	  help	  
the	  province	  preserve	  its	  Francophone	  culture.4	  Whether	  Quebec	  has	  been	  the	  biggest	  “loser”	  under	  the	  
Charter	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  debate.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  only	  a	  decade	  after	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Charter,	  many	  
authors	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  judiciary	  had	  nullified	  more	  laws	  in	  Quebec	  than	  in	  any	  other	  province	  and	  
that	   those	   laws	   touched	   on	   language,	   a	   crucial	   policy	   area	   for	   the	  maintenance	   of	   Quebec’s	   unique	  
Francophone	   identity	   in	  North	  America.5	  Others	   contended	   that	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  Charter	  on	  Quebec	  
had	  been	  overstated,	  notably	  because	  Quebec	  retained	  the	  power	  to	  limit	  the	  access	  of	  immigrants	  to	  
English	   schools	   under	   the	   new	   constitutional	   linguistic	   regime	   by	   channelling	   them	   into	   the	   French	  
education	  system.6	  	  However,	  this	  power	  has	  recently	  been	  questioned	  in	  Gosselin	  (Tutor	  of)	  v.	  Quebec	  
(Attorney	  General)7	  and	  limited	  in	  Solski	  (Tutor	  of)	  v.	  Quebec	  (Attorney	  General)8	  and	  Nguyen	  v.	  Quebec	  
(Education,	  Recreation	  and	  Sports)9	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada.	  
3See	  e.g.	  Patrick	  Monahan,	  Politics	  and	  the	  Constitution:	  The	  Charter,	  Federalism,	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  
(Agincourt:	  Carswell,	  1987)	  [Monahan,	  “Politics”];	  David	  J	  Elkins,	  “Facing	  Our	  Destiny:	  Rights	  and	  Canadian	  
Distinctiveness”	  (1989)	  22:4	  Can	  J	  Pol	  Sc	  699.	  
4See	  e.g.	  Mandel,	  supra	  note	  2;	  Guy	  Laforest,	  Pour	  la	  liberté	  d'une	  société	  distincte:	  Parcours	  d'un	  intellectuel	  
engagé	  (Sainte-­‐Foy:	  Presses	  de	  l'Université	  Laval,	  2004).	  
5See	  Guy	  Laforest,	  Trudeau	  and	  the	  End	  of	  a	  Canadian	  Dream	  translated	  by	  Paul	  Leduc	  Browne	  &	  Michelle	  
Weinroth	  (Montreal:	  McGill-­‐Queen's	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  Yves	  De	  Montigny,	  “The	  Impact	  (Real	  or	  
Apprehended)	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  on	  the	  Legislative	  Authority	  of	  Quebec”	  in	  David	  
Schneiderman	  &	  Kate	  Sutherland,	  eds,	  Charting	  the	  Consequences:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Charter	  Rights	  on	  Canadian	  Law	  
and	  Politics(Toronto:	  Published	  in	  association	  with	  the	  Centre	  for	  Constitutional	  Studies,	  University	  of	  Alberta,	  by	  
University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  1997)	  3;	  F	  L	  Morton,	  “Judicial	  Politics	  Canadian	  Style:	  The	  Supreme	  Court's	  
Contribution	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Crisis	  of	  1992”	  in	  Curtis	  Cook,	  ed,	  Constitutional	  Predicament:	  Canada	  after	  the	  
Referendum	  of	  1992(Montreal:	  McGill-­‐Queen's	  University	  Press,	  1994)	  132.	  
6See	  especially	  James	  B	  Kelly,	  “Reconciling	  Rights	  and	  Federalism	  During	  Review	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  
Freedoms:	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  and	  the	  Centralization	  Thesis,	  1982	  to	  1999”	  (2001)	  34:2Can	  J	  Pol	  Sc321;	  
Peter	  H	  Russell,	  “The	  Political	  Purposes	  of	  the	  Charter:	  Have	  They	  Been	  Fulfilled?	  An	  Agnostic	  Report	  Card”	  in	  Philip	  
Bryden,	  Steven	  Davis	  &	  John	  Russel,	  eds,	  Protecting	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms:	  Essays	  on	  the	  Charter's	  Place	  in	  Canada's	  
Political,	  Legal	  and	  	  Intellectual	  Life	  (Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  1994)	  33.	  
72005	  SCC	  15,	  [2005]	  1	  SCR	  238	  [Gosselin	  cited	  to	  SCC].	  
82005	  SCC	  14,	  [2005]	  1	  SCR	  201	  [Solski	  cited	  to	  SCC].	  
92009	  SCC	  47,	  [2009]	  3	  SCR	  208	  [Nguyen	  cited	  to	  SCC].	  
3	  
	  
The	  aforementioned	  trilogy	  of	  cases	  shows	  that	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  rights	  embodied	  in	  
the	  Charter	  remains	  salient.	  Therefore,	  this	  article	   is	   interested	   in	  evaluating	  whether	  Quebec	  has	   lost	  
relevance	  in	  the	  constitutional	  politics	  of	  language.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  proposes	  a	  doctrinal	  analysis	  of	  
the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Charter	  jurisprudence,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  most	  recent	  body	  of	  case	  law,	  and	  
an	   assessment	   of	   its	   political	   consequences	   in	   the	   area	   of	   language	   policy	   in	  Quebec.	   The	   article	  will	  
argue	   that	   constitutional	   review	   has	   increasingly	   protected	   individual	   rights	   over	   Quebec’s	   collective	  
right	   to	  maintain	   its	   language	  and	   culture.	   This	   can	  be	  explained	  by	   the	  move	   towards	   an	   implacable	  
parallel	  constitutionalism	  and	  a	  redefinition	  of	  official	  minority	   linguistic	  rights	   in	  the	  jurisprudence,	  as	  
well	   as	   by	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   Quebec's	   legislative	   counterattacks	   to	   court	   rulings.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	   article	   will	   conclude	   that	   Quebec	   is	   no	   longer	   driving	   concepts	   of	   Canadian	   citizenship.	  
Undifferentiated,	   rather	   than	   multinational,	   citizenship	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   direction	   in	   which	   Charter	  
language	   jurisprudence	   is	   taking	  Canada.	  But	  before	   taking	  on	   this	   task,	   this	  paper	  will	   show	  how	  the	  
content	  and	  scope	  of	  language	  rights	  have	  evolved	  in	  Quebec	  since	  Confederation	  as	  well	  as	  how	  they	  
have	  influenced	  conceptions	  of	  Canadian	  citizenship.	  	  
	  
	  
I. Language	  Rights	  in	  Quebec	  and	  Canadian	  Citizenship	  
Citizenship	  is	  a	  multifaceted	  concept	  that	  gives	  way	  to	  many	  definitional	  and	  theoretical	  challenges.10	  
A	   recurring	   theme	   in	   the	   literature	   is	   the	   primordial	   link	   between	   citizenship	   and	   access	   to	   rights	   in	  
liberal	   democracies.	   In	   his	   famous	   Citizenship	   and	   Social	   Class,	   T.H.	   Marshall	   argued	   that	   citizenship	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10See	  Linda	  Bosniak,	  “Citizenship	  Denationalized”	  (2000)	  7:2	  Ind	  J	  of	  Global	  Legal	  Stud447;	  Will	  Kymlicka	  &	  Wayne	  
Norman,	  “Return	  of	  the	  Citizen:	  A	  Survey	  of	  Recent	  Work	  on	  Citizenship	  Theory”	  (1994)	  104:2Ethics	  352;	  Pater	  
Schuck,	  “Citizenship	  in	  Federal	  Systems”	  (2000)	  48:2	  Am	  J	  Comp	  L	  195;	  Jane	  Jenson,	  “Introduction:	  Thinking	  About	  
Citizenship	  and	  Law	  in	  an	  Era	  of	  Change”	  in	  Law	  Commission	  of	  Canada,	  ed,	  Law	  and	  Citizenship(Vancouver:	  UBC	  
Press,	  2006)	  3.	  
4	  
consisted	  of	  political,	  civil	  and	  social	  rights	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  modern	  capitalist	  order.11	  This	  rights-­‐
based	  vision	  of	  citizenship	  has	  since	  been	  enlarged	  to	   include	  cultural	  rights,	  such	  as	   linguistic	  rights.12	  
The	  nature	  of	  the	  cultural	  rights	  granted	  in	  any	  polity	  informs	  its	  type	  of	  citizenship.	  On	  one	  end	  of	  the	  
spectrum	  lies	  the	  “universal”	  or	  “undifferentiated”	  conception	  of	  citizenship	  which	  recognizes	  the	  right-­‐
bearing	  equality	  of	  individuals	  and	  is	  blind	  to	  cultural	  group	  differences,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  “pluralist”	  
or	  “differentiated”	  conception	  of	  citizenship	  which	  posits	  that	  substantive	  equality	  requires	  a	  differential	  
treatment	  of	  certain	  cultural	  groups.13	  
Differentiated	  citizenship	  can	  take	  many	  forms	  depending	  on	  the	  level	  of	  diversity	  that	   it	  promotes	  
and	  how	  it	   translates	   into	  rights	  and	  policies.	  Will	  Kymlicka	  distinguishes	  “polyethnic”	  citizenship	  from	  
“multinational”	   citizenship.14	  “Polyethnic”	   citizenship	   is	   associated	  with	   group	   differentiated	   rights	   for	  
immigrants	   which	   promote	   cultural	   retention,	   for	   example	   ethno-­‐cultural	   activities	   funding	   and	  
exemption	  rights,	  but	   insists	  on	  the	  necessity	  to	   facilitate	  their	   integration	   into	  mainstream	  society	  by	  
providing	   official-­‐language	   training.	   By	   often	   recognizing	   equally	   all	   cultural	   differences,	   “polyethnic”	  
citizenship	   is	   close	   to	   the	   “undifferentiated”	   model	   on	   the	   citizenship	   spectrum.	   In	   contrast,	  
“multinational”	  citizenship	  involves	  self-­‐government	  rights	  given	  to	  national	  minorities,	  such	  as	  French-­‐
Quebeckers,	   to	   help	   them	   counter	   cultural	   assimilation	   from	   the	   dominant	   society	   and	   maintain	   a	  
distinct	  collective	  identity.15	  
11TH	  Marshall,	  Citizenship	  and	  Social	  Class:	  And	  Other	  Essays	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1950).	  
12See	  especially	  Will	  Kymlicka,	  Multicultural	  Citizenship:	  A	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  Minority	  Rights	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1995).	  
13Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  “Polity	  and	  Group	  Difference:	  A	  Critique	  of	  the	  Ideal	  of	  Universal	  Citizenship”	  (1989)	  99:2	  
Ethics	  250.	  
14Kymlicka,	  supra	  note	  12.	  
15Ibid.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Kymlicka’s	  protection	  of	  collective	  identities	  finds	  its	  justification	  in	  
individual	  autonomy.	  For	  a	  different	  view,	  see	  Dwight	  Newman,	  “Putting	  Kymlicka	  in	  Perspective:	  
Canadian	  Diversity	  and	  Collective	  Rights”	  in	  Stephen	  Tierney,	  ed.	  Accommodating	  Cultural	  Diversity	  (New	  
Hampshire:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Company,	  2007)	  59.	  
5	  
Alan	  Patten	  and	  Will	  Kymlicka	  argue	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  language	  rights	  are	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  
the	  establishment	  of	  multinationalism.16	  They	  categorize	   language	  rights	  and	  policies	  according	  to	  four	  
distinctions:	   “(1)	   tolerance	   vs	   promotion-­‐oriented	   rights;	   (2)	   norm-­‐and-­‐accommodation	   vs	   official-­‐
languages	  rights	   regimes;	   (3)	  personality	  vs	   territoriality	   rights	   regimes;	  and	   (4)	   individual	  vs	  collective	  
rights.”17	  National	   minorities	   not	   only	   expect	   tolerance	   rights,	   which	   prevents	   state	   intervention	   in	  
individual's	  private	   language	  choices,	   they	  additionally	   claim	  promotion-­‐oriented	   rights,	  which	   require	  
the	   use	   of	   the	   minorities'	   language	   within	   state	   institutions. 18 	  They	   have	   also	   preferred	   the	  
establishment	   of	   official-­‐language	   rights	   regime,	   as	   opposed	   to	   simple	   accommodations	   for	   their	  
members	  who	  lack	  proficiency	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  majority.19	  
Of	   importance	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   multinational	   citizenship	   are	   the	   distinctions	   between	  
personality-­‐based	  and	  territoriality-­‐based	   linguistic	  rights	  regimes	  and	  the	  one	  between	   individual	  and	  
collective	  linguistic	  rights.	  Linguistic	  rights	  regime	  can	  be	  organized	  on	  the	  territorial	  principle	  according	  
to	  which	  “languages	  rights	  should	  vary	   from	  region	  to	  region	  according	  to	   local	  conditions,”	  or	  on	  the	  
personality	  principle	  according	  to	  which	  “citizens	  should	  enjoy	  the	  same	  set	  of	  (official)	  language	  rights	  
no	   matter	   where	   they	   are	   in	   the	   country.” 20 	  The	   self-­‐government	   rights	   associated	   with	   the	  
multinational	  model	  imply	  the	  capacity	  to	  impose	  a	  linguistic	  regime	  on	  a	  delimited	  territory.	  As	  for	  the	  
collective	  aspect	  of	  language	  rights,	  it	  manifests	  itself	  when	  their	  enforcement	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  certain	  
threshold	  level	  of	  demand,	  and	  therefore	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  community,	  or	  when	  their	  primary	  intended	  
16	  Alan	  Patten	  &	  Will	  Kymlicka,	  “Language	  Rights	  and	  Political	  Theory:	  Context,	  Issues,	  and	  Approaches”	  in	  Will	  
Kymlicka	  and	  Alan	  Patten,	  eds,	  Language	  Rights	  and	  Political	  Theory	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003)	  1	  at	  
5.	  
17	  Ibid	  at	  26.	  
18	  Ibid	  at	  27.	  See	  also	  Heinz	  Kloss,	  “Language	  Rights	  of	  Immigrant	  Groups”	  (1971)	  5:2	  International	  Migration	  
Review	  250.	  
19	  Patten	  &	  Kymlicka,	  supra	  note	  16	  at	  27-­‐9.	  
20	  Ibid	  at	  29.	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beneficiary	   is	   a	   collectivity	   as	   opposed	   to	   individuals.21	  	   The	   collective	   goals	   pursued	   by	   national	  
minorities	  is	  either	  linguistic	  security	  or	  survival.22	  Significant	  here	  are	  “external	  protections”	  which	  refer	  
to	  the	  national	  minority’s	  ability	  to	  “protect	  its	  distinct	  existence	  and	  identity	  by	  limiting	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  decisions	  of	  the	  larger	  society.”23	  Measures	  like	  these	  have	  been	  implemented	  by	  the	  government	  of	  
Quebec	  to	  limit	  access	  to	  public	  English	  schools.24	  
Quebec's	   use	   of	   external	   protections	   has	   conflicted	  with	   the	   recognition	   of	   linguistic	   rights	   of	   the	  
members	   of	   its	   Anglophone	   minority.25	  For	   Patten	   and	   Kymlicka,	   these	   rights	   fall	   into	   the	   collective	  
rights	   category	   by	   virtue	   of	   being	   group-­‐differentiated.26	  As	   Denise	   G.	   Réaume	   explains,	   the	   group-­‐
differentiated	   rights	   of	   English	   and	   French	  minorities,	   though	   they	   are	   granted	   to	   individuals,	   aim	   at	  
protecting	   language	  communities.27	  However,	  Anglophones	   in	  Quebec	  have	   traditionally	  been	  more	   in	  
favour	  of	  an	  undifferentiated	  citizenship.	  More	  specifically,	  they	  would	  have	  preferred	  non	  Quebec	  state	  
intervention	  in	  linguistic	  matters	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  individuals'	  equal	  right	  to	  choose	  the	  language	  of	  
their	   choice	   in	   the	  public	   sphere.	  Nonetheless,	   the	   very	   existence	  of	   their	   rights	   depends	  upon,	   or	   at	  
least	   is	   intimately	   related	   to,	   the	   notion	   of	  multinational	   citizenship.	   That	   is,	   if	   Quebec	   did	   not	   have	  
important	   self-­‐government	   rights	   as	   regards	   language,	   minority	   language	   rights	   for	   Anglophones	   in	  
Quebec	  would	  be	  unnecessary.	  Also,	   just	   like	  minority	   language	   rights	   given	   to	   Francophones	  outside	  
21	  Ibid	  at	  30.	  
22	  bid	  at	  31.	  
23Kymlicka,	  supra	  note	  12	  at	  36.	  
24	  These	  external	  restrictions	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  internal	  restrictions,	  as	  they	  restrict	  the	  linguistic	  rights	  of	  
Francophone	  Quebeckers,	  themselves	  ‘internal’	  members	  of	  the	  collectivity	  being	  protected.	  See	  Newman,	  supra	  
note	  15.	  
25	  Denise	  G.	  Réaume,	  “Beyond	  Personality:	  The	  Territorial	  and	  Personal	  Principles	  of	  Language	  Policy	  
Reconsidered”	  in	  Will	  Kymlicka	  &	  Alan	  Patten,	  eds,	  Language	  Rights	  and	  Political	  Theory	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2003)	  271;	  FL	  Morton,	  “Group	  Rights	  Versus	  Individual	  Rights	  in	  the	  Charter:	  The	  Special	  Cases	  of	  
Natives	  and	  the	  Québécois”	  in	  Neil	  Nevitte	  &	  Allan	  Kornberg,	  eds,	  Minorities	  and	  the	  Canadian	  State	  (Oakville:	  
Mosaic	  Press,	  1985)	  71.	  
26	  Patten	  &	  Kymlicka,	  supra	  note	  16	  at	  30.	  
27	  Réaume,	  supra	  note	  25	  at	  288.	  Contra	  FL	  Morton,	  “Group	  Rights	  Versus	  Individual	  Rights	  in	  the	  Charter:	  The	  
Special	  Cases	  of	  Natives	  and	  the	  Québécois”	  in	  Neil	  Nevitte	  &	  Allan	  Kornberg,	  eds,	  Minorities	  and	  the	  Canadian	  
State	  (Oakville:	  Mosaic	  Press,	  1985)	  71	  at	  71-­‐2.	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Quebec	   are	   the	   extensions	   of	   the	   national	   minority	   rights	   of	   Francophone-­‐Quebeckers,28	  minority	  
language	   rights	   given	   to	   Anglophone-­‐Quebeckers	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  
Anglophone	  Canadian	  majority.	  
	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  different	  conceptions	  of	  citizenship	  have	  conflicted	  and	  prevailed	  
in	  Canada	  over	  time.	  Of	  interest	  is	  the	  province	  of	  Quebec’s	  linguistic	  rights	  system	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  
character	  of	  Canadian	  citizenship	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  following	  paragraphs	  will	  explore	  three	  key	  legal	  texts	  
that	  have	  redefined	  Quebec’s	  linguistic	  regime	  and	  inevitably	  influenced	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  Canadian	  
citizenship	  was	  taken:	  The	  British	  North	  America	  Act,	  1867,29	  the	  Charter	  of	  French	  Language,	  197730	  and	  
the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms,	  1982.31	  
	  
First,	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   British	   North	   America	   Act,	   1867	   (hereinafter	   “BNAA”)	   established	   both	  
French	   and	   English	   as	   the	   languages	   of	   the	   legislatures32	  and	   the	   courts	   through	   section	   133.	   It	   also	  
guaranteed,	   through	   section	  93,	   rights	   to	  denominational	   schools,	  which	  at	   the	   time	  of	   its	   enactment	  
were	   divided	   along	   linguistic	   lines.	   By	   doing	   so,	   the	   BNAA	   recognized	   group-­‐differentiated	   rights	   to	  
French-­‐Catholics	  and	  English-­‐Protestants.	  But	  most	  importantly,	  the	  BNAA	  created	  Canadian	  federalism	  
with	  sections	  91	  to	  95,	  which	  relate	  to	  the	  division	  of	  powers	  between	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  the	  
provinces.	   Many	   argued	   that	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   federal	   system	   was	   made	   to	   grant	   to	   the	   province	   of	  
Quebec	  the	  powers	  necessary	  for	  the	  cultural	  survival	  of	  its	  Francophone	  majority	  within	  a	  larger	  union,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Kymlicka,	  supra	  note	  12	  at	  45-­‐46.	  
29The	  British	  North	  America	  Act,	  1867	  (U.K.),	  30	  &	  31	  Victoria,	  c.	  3.	  
30RSQ	  1977,	  c	  C-­‐11	  [CFL].	  
31Charter,	  supra	  note	  1.	  
32The	  use	  of	  French	  and	  English	  are	  permitted	  in	  the	  Parliament	  of	  Canada	  and	  the	  Quebec	  legislature.	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in	  exchange	   for	   its	  adhesion	  to	   the	  Confederation	  project.33	  Thus,	   the	  powers	  given	  to	   the	  province	  of	  
Quebec,	   notably	   in	   the	   exclusive	   jurisdictions	   of	   education	   and	   civil	   rights,	   have	   amounted	   to	   self-­‐
government	  rights	  given	  to	  the	  French	  Quebecker	  majority,	  since	  it	  was	  in	  control	  of	  the	  provincial	  state	  
apparatus.34	  Moreover,	  the	  territorially-­‐based	  collective	  rights	  given	  to	  French-­‐Quebeckers	  signified	  that	  
Canadian	  citizenship	  was	  to	  some	  extent	  binational.35	  
	  
Second,	  the	  province	  of	  Quebec	  also	  furthered	  the	  differentiation	  of	  Canadian	  citizenship	  by	  taking	  
its	   linguistic	   destiny	   in	   its	   own	   hands	   through	   self-­‐government	   means.	   After	   the	   Quiet	   Revolution,	  
different	  Quebec	  governments	  enacted	  several	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  intended	  to	  safeguard	  the	  vitality	  of	  
the	   French	   language	   in	   the	   province,	   culminating	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Charter	   of	   the	   French	  
Language,	   1977	   (hereinafter	   “CFL”),	   also	   known	   as	   Bill	   101,	   by	   the	   Parti	   Québécois.	   This	   document,	  
which	  has	  quasi-­‐constitutional	  status	  in	  Quebec,	  notably	  advanced	  the	  francization	  of	  the	  work	  place	  by	  
requiring	  that	  all	   firms	  of	   fifty	  or	  more	  employees	  operate	   in	  French,	  and	  by	  mandating	  that	  all	  public	  
and	  commercial	  signs	  be	  in	  French	  only.	   It	  also	  reduced	  accessibility	  to	  English-­‐language	  instruction	  by	  
restricting	  it	  to	  those	  children	  whose	  parents	  had	  received	  primary	  school	  instruction	  in	  English	  “in	  the	  
province	   of	   Quebec.”	  36	  Though	   the	   language	   of	   this	   provision,	   known	   as	   the	   “Quebec	   clause,”	   was	  
written	   in	   individualistic	   terms,	   it	   had	   a	   collective	   purpose.	   This	   external	   protection	   had	   been	   put	   in	  
place	  to	  ensure	  that	  immigrant	  groups,	  whether	  from	  other	  Canadian	  provinces	  or	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  
would	   integrate	   into	   the	   French	  majority	   culture.	  Concurrently,	   the	  Quebec	   government	   tried	   to	   gain	  
more	   power	   over	   immigration,	   a	   federal	   area	   of	   jurisdiction,	   to	   favour	   the	   establishment	   of	   French-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33See	  for	  example	  Samuel	  V	  LaSelva,	  The	  Moral	  Foundations	  of	  Canadian	  Federalism:	  Paradoxes,	  Achievements,	  
and	  Tragedies	  of	  Nationhood	  (Montreal:	  McGill-­‐Queen's	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Gil	  Rémillard,	  Le	  fédéralisme	  
canadien:	  Éléments	  constitutionnels	  de	  formation	  et	  d'évolution	  (Montréal:	  Québec/Amérique,	  1980).	  
34Because	  of	  this,	  the	  terms	  “government	  of	  Quebec”	  and	  “French-­‐Quebeckers”	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  in	  this	  
paper.	  
35See	  especially	  Joseph	  Eliot	  Magnet,	  “Collective	  Rights,	  Cultural	  Autonomy	  and	  the	  Canadian	  State”	  (1986)	  32:1	  
McGill	  LJ	  170.	  
36CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  s	  73(a).	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speaking	  migrants	  on	  its	  territory.	  To	  that	  effect,	  it	  signed	  several	  bilateral	  agreements	  with	  the	  federal	  
government	  in	  the	  1970s.37	  	  Still,	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  newcomers’	  linguistic	  transfers	  to	  English,	  due	  to	  the	  
socio-­‐economic	   attractiveness	   of	   this	   language	   as	   compared	   to	   French,	   had	   dampened	   the	   hope	   of	  
survival	  of	  the	  French	  fact	  in	  North	  America.	  By	  making	  French	  the	  common	  and	  sole	  language	  of	  public	  
life,	  the	  CFL	  consolidated	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  distinctive	  Quebec	  citizenship	  within	  Canada.38	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  Charter	  broke	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  BNAA	  by	  imposing	  limits	  on	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Quebec	  
government,	   and	   thus	   the	   territorial	   collective	   rights	   of	   French-­‐Quebeckers,	   notably	   in	   the	   area	   of	  
language,	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  individual	  citizens.	  By	  promoting	  an	  individualised	  bilingualism	  as	  opposed	  to	  
a	   territorialized	   one,	   it	   also	   clashed	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   CFL.	   First,	   the	   constitutional	   document	  
guarantees	   civil	   rights	   such	   as	   the	   individual	   freedom	   of	   expression	   (section	   2(b))	   and	   the	   right	   to	  
equality	   (section	  15),	  which	   forbids	  discrimination	  based	  on	  ascriptive	  traits.	  Second,	   it	  confers	  group-­‐
differentiated	  rights	  to	  members	  of	  official	  language	  minorities	  (sections	  16	  to	  23).	  The	  official	  language	  
rights,	   found	   in	   sections	   16	   to	   22,	   give	   French	   and	   English	   the	   status	   of	   official	   languages	   in	   the	  
operations	  of	   the	   federal	   government	  and	   the	  government	  of	  New	  Brunswick.	   They	  extend	   the	   rights	  
found	   in	   section	  133	  of	   the	  BNAA	  and	  constitutionalize	   the	  principles	  of	   the	  Official	   Languages	  Act	  of	  
Canada,	  1969.39	  The	  addition	  to	  the	  constitutional	  edifice	  of	  Canada	  of	  educational	  rights	  for	  members	  
of	  linguistic	  minorities,	  listed	  under	  section	  23,	  was	  a	  novelty.	  Though	  denominational	  education	  rights	  
had	  been	  protected	  since	  Confederation,	  the	  courts	  ruled	  that	  they	  did	  not	  include	  educational	  linguistic	  
rights.40	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37The	  Lang-­‐Cloutier	  Agreement	  (1971),	  the	  Andras-­‐Bienvenue	  Agreement	  (1973),	  and	  the	  Cullen-­‐Couture	  
Agreement	  (1978).	  
38	  Alain-­‐G	  Gagnon	  &Raffaele	  Iacovino,	  “Interculturalism:	  Expanding	  the	  Boudaries	  of	  Citizenship”	  in	  
Alain-­‐G	  Gagnon,	  ed,	  Québec:	  State	  &	  Society	  (Peterborough:	  Broadview	  Press,	  2004)	  369.	  
39Official	  LanguagesAct,	  1968-­‐1969,	  c	  54.	  
40Ottawa	  Separate	  Schools	  Trustees	  v.	  MacKell,	  [1916]	  JCJ	  7,	  [1917]	  AC	  62;	  Bureau	  métropolitain	  des	  




While	  Quebec	   language	  policy	  has	  been	  challenged	  under	   sections	  2(b)	  and	  15,	   it	  has	  mostly	  been	  
challenged	   under	   section	   23.	   At	   first	   glance,	   the	   detailed	   nature	   of	   Anglophones’	   educational	   rights	  
interferes	   directly	   with	   Quebec’s	   constitutional	   power	   to	   legislate	   in	   the	   field	   of	   education.41	  For	  
example,	  section	  23(1)(b)	  of	  the	  Charter,	  known	  as	  the	  “Canada	  clause”,	  had	  been	  enshrined	  specifically	  
to	  invalidate	  the	  “Quebec	  clause”	  found	  in	  the	  CFL.	  The	  former	  clause	  provided	  that	  all	  children	  whose	  
parents	   had	   received	   primary	   school	   instruction	   in	   English	   “anywhere	   in	   Canada”	   had	   the	   right	   to	  
minority	  language	  education,	  and	  not	  just	  “in	  the	  province	  of	  Quebec.”	  	  Section	  23	  rights	  were	  thus	  to	  
be	  modeled	  on	  the	  personality	  principle	  whereby	  rights	  are	  available	  to	  individuals	  irrespective	  of	  their	  
geographical	  location.	  Though	  these	  rights	  would	  be	  exercised	  individually,	  they	  were	  conditional	  on	  the	  
existence	  of	   a	   linguistic	   community	   and	   thus	  maintain	   a	   territorial	   element.42	  Section	  23(3)(a)	   notably	  
provides	   that	   these	   rights	   can	   only	   be	   granted	  where	   a	   sufficient	   number	   of	   rights-­‐holders	   exist	   in	   a	  
particular	  area	  to	  warrant	  the	  public	  funding	  of	  educational	  facilities.43	  
	  
Nonetheless,	   the	   1982	   constitution	   provides	   remedial	   mechanisms	   for	   Quebec	   to	   protect	   its	   self-­‐
government	  rights	  concerning	  language	  policy.	  First,	  the	  Charter’s	  drafters	  exempted	  Quebec	  in	  section	  
59	   of	   the	   Constitution	   Act,	   1982	   from	   having	   to	   comply	   with	   section	   23(1)(a)	   of	   the	   Charter.	   This	  
provision	  known	  as	  the	  “mother	  tongue	  clause”	  guarantees	  the	  right	  to	  education	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  
minority	  to	  Canadian	  citizens	  whose	  first	   language	  learned	  and	  still	  understood	  is	  that	  of	  the	  minority.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41Mandel,	  supra	  note	  2	  at	  142.	  
42	  Monahan,	  supra	  note	  3	  at	  112;	  Vanessa	  Gruben,	  “Language	  Rights	  in	  Canada:	  A	  Theoretical	  Approach”	  (2008)	  
SCLR	  (2d)	  39	  at	  115-­‐6.	  
43	  Charter,	  supra	  note	  1,	  s	  23(3)	  reads	  as	  follows:	  “The	  right	  of	  citizens	  of	  Canada	  under	  subsections	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  to	  
have	  their	  children	  receive	  primary	  and	  secondary	  school	  instruction	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  English	  or	  French	  
linguistic	  minority	  population	  of	  a	  province	  (a)	  applies	  wherever	  in	  the	  province	  the	  number	  of	  children	  of	  citizens	  




Quebec	  had	   tried	  a	  mother	   tongue	   regime	  with	   the	  adoption	  of	  Bill	  22	   in	  197444	  and	  was	  of	   the	  view	  
that	  it	  had	  failed.45	  Not	  only	  was	  it	  difficult	  to	  apply	  in	  practice,	  it	  prompted	  the	  integration	  of	  a	  majority	  
of	  Allophones	  into	  the	  English	  educational	  system.46	  The	  exemption	  found	  in	  section	  59	  thus	  consisted	  in	  
a	  political	  compromise	  between	  the	  Charter's	  drafters	  and	  Quebec	  to	  assuage	  the	  latter's	  concerns.47	  
	  
Second,	  the	  limitation	  clause	  found	  in	  section	  1	  of	  the	  Charter	  provides	  that	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  are	  
“subject	  only	  to	  such	  reasonable	  limits	  prescribed	  by	  law	  as	  can	  be	  demonstrably	  justified	  in	  a	  free	  and	  
democratic	  society”.	   	   In	  the	  context	  of	   judicial	   review,	  the	  onus	   is	  on	  the	  government	  to	  demonstrate	  
that	   its	   impugned	   legislation	   withstands	   a	   section	   1	   analysis	   according	   to	   the	  Oakes	   test.48	  As	   Janet	  
Hiebert	  explained:	  
	  
An	  expansive	   interpretation	  of	   section	  1	  would	   allow	  Parliament	   and	   the	  provincial	   legislatures	   to	  
promote,	  where	  justified,	  values	  other	  than	  those	  specifically	  enumerated	  in	  the	  Charter.	  This	  would	  
enrich	  the	  Charter	  by	  embracing	  collective	  values	  that,	  like	  individual	  rights,	  are	  relevant	  to	  Canadian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44Official	  Language	  Act,	  RSQ	  1974,	  c	  6,	  ss	  40-­‐41.	  
45Jean-­‐Pierre	  Proulx,	  “Le	  choc	  des	  chartes:	  histoire	  des	  régimes	  juridiques	  québécois	  et	  canadien	  en	  matière	  de	  
langue	  d'enseignement”	  (1989)	  23	  RJT	  67	  at	  110-­‐13.	  
46Ibid.	  
47Ibid	  at	  163-­‐67.	  
48	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  developed	  a	  test	  for	  the	  application	  of	  the	  limitation	  clause	  in	  R.	  v.	  Oakes,	  [1986]	  
1	  SCR	  103,	  26	  DLR	  (4th)	  200.	  The	  Oakes	  test	  was	  later	  clarified	  by	  Justice	  Iacobucci	  in	  Egan	  v.	  Canada,[1995]	  2	  SCR	  
513,	  124	  DLR	  (4th)	  609	  at	  para	  182:	  	  
First,	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  legislation	  must	  be	  pressing	  and	  substantial.	  Second,	  the	  means	  chosen	  to	  
attain	  this	  legislative	  end	  must	  be	  reasonable	  and	  demonstrably	  justifiable	  in	  a	  free	  and	  democratic	  
society.	  In	  order	  to	  satisfy	  the	  second	  requirement,	  three	  criteria	  must	  be	  satisfied:	  (1)	  the	  rights	  
violation	  must	  be	  rationally	  connected	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  legislation;	  (2)	  the	  impugned	  provision	  must	  
minimally	  impair	  the	  Charter	  guarantee;	  and	  (3)	  there	  must	  be	  a	  proportionality	  between	  the	  effect	  
of	  the	  measure	  and	  its	  objective	  so	  that	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  legislative	  goal	  is	  not	  outweighed	  by	  
the	  abridgement	  of	  the	  right.	  In	  all	  s.	  1	  cases	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  is	  with	  the	  government	  to	  show	  on	  
a	  balance	  of	  probabilities	  that	  the	  violation	  is	  justifiable.	  
12	  
	  
conceptions	  of	  a	  just	  and	  democratic	  society	  yet	  are	  not	  adequately	  captured	  by	  the	  Charter’s	  highly	  
individualist	  language.49	  
	  
Indeed,	   section	  1	   gives	  Quebec	   the	  opportunity	   to	   justify	   limits	   on	   individuals'	   language	   rights	   on	   the	  
basis	  that	  they	  are	  necessary	  to	  allow	  the	  province's	  collective	  French	  public	  culture	  to	  flourish.	  
	  
Third,	  section	  33,	  better	  known	  as	  the	  “derogatory	  clause”	  or	  the	  “notwithstanding	  clause”,	  can	  be	  
used	  by	  governments	  to	  immunise	  themselves	  from	  past	  or	  future	  judicial	  review	  under	  the	  Charter.	  It	  
stipulates	  that	  “Parliament	  or	  the	  legislature	  of	  a	  province	  may	  expressly	  declare	  in	  an	  Act	  of	  Parliament	  
or	   of	   the	   legislature,	   as	   the	   case	   may	   be,	   that	   the	   Act	   or	   a	   provision	   thereof	   shall	   operate	  
notwithstanding	  a	  provision	  included	  in	  section	  2	  or	  sections	  7	  to	  15	  of	  this	  Charter.”50	  	  This	  clause	  has	  a	  
five-­‐year	   limitation	   period,	   after	   which	   the	   concerned	   government	   must	   comply	   with	   Charter	  
requirements	   or	   re-­‐enact	   the	   override.	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   official	   language	   and	   educational	  
rights	  of	  the	  Charter	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  notwithstanding	  clause,	  significantly	  limits	  Quebec’s	  capacity	  
to	  affirm	  its	  parliamentary	  authority	  in	  language	  policy	  matters.	  
	  
Overall,	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Charter	   signalled	   an	   important	   step	   towards	   an	   undifferentiation	   of	  
Canadian	  citizenship	  in	  which	  primacy	  was	  given	  to	  the	  right-­‐bearing	  equality	  of	  individuals	  as	  opposed	  
to	  the	  self-­‐governing	  rights	  of	  collectivities.51	  Quebec	  was	  not	  able	  to	  prevent	  this	   ideological	  turn	  and	  
would	  have	  to	  face	  its	  consequences	  through	  Charter-­‐based	  judicial	  review.	  	  While	  the	  Charter	  provides	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49Janet	  Hiebert,	  Limiting	  Rights:	  The	  Dilemma	  of	  Judicial	  Review	  (Montreal,	  Buffalo:	  McGill-­‐Queen's	  University	  
Press,	  1996)	  at	  138.	  
50Charter,	  supra	  note	  1,	  s	  33.	  
51See	  especially	  Jane	  Jenson,	  “Citizenship	  and	  Equity:	  Variations	  across	  Time	  and	  in	  Space”	  in	  Janet	  Hiebert,	  ed,	  
Political	  Ethics:	  A	  Canadian	  Perspective	  (Ottawa:	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Electoral	  Reform	  and	  Party	  Financing	  and	  
Canada	  Communications	  Group,	  Supply	  and	  Services	  Canada	  and	  Dundurn	  Press,	  1991);	  Pierre	  Elliott	  Trudeau,	  
“The	  Values	  of	  a	  Just	  Society”	  in	  Tom	  Axworthy	  &	  Pierre	  Elliott	  Trudeau,	  eds,	  Towards	  a	  Just	  Society:	  The	  Trudeau	  
Years	  (Markham:	  Viking,	  1990).	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an	  inherent	  logic	  to	  guide	  judicial	  review,	  judicial	  discretion	  remains	  wide	  as	  justices	  can	  interpret	  it	  in	  a	  
restrictive	  or	  non-­‐restrictive	  fashion.	  Furthermore,	  Quebec	  can	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  Charter-­‐based	  
judicial	   review	   with	   its	   legislative	   responses	   to	   legal	   opinions.	   According	   to	   constitutional	   dialogue	  
theory,	  elected	  officials	  can	  “revers[e],	  modif[y],	  or	  avoi[d]”52	  unfavourable	  judgments.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  
will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  next	  sections,	  Charter-­‐based	  judicial	  review	  in	  the	  area	  of	  language	  policy	  has	  played	  
in	  the	  province’s	  disfavour.	  
	  
	  
II. Early	  Language	  Rights	  Jurisprudence:	  The	  Path	  towards	  Linguistic	  Peace	  
	  
All	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  Charter	  cases	  in	  the	  area	  of	  minority	  language	  originating	  from	  Quebec	  have	  
challenged	   important	   provisions	   of	   the	   CFL.	   Immediately	   after	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   Charter,	   the	  
National	  Assembly	  retrospectively	  invoked	  the	  notwithstanding	  clause	  to	  protect	  all	  of	   its	   legislation	  in	  
An	   Act	   respecting	   the	   Constitution	   Act,	   1982.53	  Concretely,	   all	   of	   Quebec’s	   statutes	   adopted	   before	   the	  
coming	   into	   force	  of	   the	  Charter	  were	   re-­‐enacted	   to	   include	  an	  override	  provision	   to	   the	  effect	   that	   the	  
statutes	   would	   operate	   notwithstanding	   a	   provision	   included	   in	   section	   2	   or	   sections	   7	   to	   15	   of	   the	  
Charter.	   However,	   this	   blanket	   override	   strategy	   did	   not	   prevent	   the	   CFL	   from	   being	   challenged	   under	  
section	   23	   of	   the	  Charter.	   The	   period	   that	   followed	   took	   the	   appearance	   of	   a	   language	  war	   that	  was	  
played	  out	  in	  the	  courts	  between	  the	  Quebec	  government	  and	  the	  Anglo-­‐Quebecker	  community.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52Peter	  W	  Hogg	  &	  Allison	  A	  Bushell,	  “The	  Charter	  Dialogue	  between	  Courts	  and	  Legislatures	  (Or	  Perhaps	  the	  
Charter	  of	  Rights	  Isn't	  such	  a	  Bad	  Thing	  Afterall”	  (1997)	  35:1	  Osgoode	  Hall	  LJ	  50	  at	  80;	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  constitutional	  
dialogue	  theory	  see	  also	  Christopher	  P.	  Manfredi	  &	  James	  B.	  Kelly,	  	  “Six	  Degrees	  of	  Dialogue:	  A	  Response	  to	  Hogg	  
and	  Bushell”	  (1999)	  37:3	  Osgoode	  Hall	  LJ	  513;	  Matthew	  Hennigar,	  “Expanding	  the	  ‘Dialogue’	  Debate:	  Canadian	  
Federal	  Government	  Responses	  to	  Lower	  Court	  Charter	  Decisions”(2004)	  37:1	  Can	  J	  Pol	  Sc	  3;	  James	  B.	  Kelly,	  
Governing	  with	  the	  Charter:	  Legislative	  and	  Judicial	  Activism	  and	  Framers'	  Intent	  (Vancouver:	  UBC	  Press,	  2005);	  
Peter	  W.	  Hogg,	  Allison	  A.	  Bushell	  Thornton	  &	  Wade	  K.	  Wright,	  “Charter	  Dialogue	  Revisited:	  Much	  Ado	  about	  





A. A.G.	  (Que.)	  v.	  Quebec	  Protestant	  School	  Boards	  (1984)	  
	  
The	  first	  Charter	  case	  aimed	  at	  challenging	  the	  CFL	  under	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter	  was	  A.G.	  (Que)	  v.	  
Quebec	   Protestant	   School	   Boards. 54 	  The	   unanimous	   decision	   declared	   that	   provisions	   regarding	  
instruction	  in	  English	  found	  in	  sections	  72	  and	  73	  of	  the	  CFL,	  which	  made-­‐up	  the	  “Quebec	  clause”,	  were	  
inconsistent	   with	   the	   “Canada	   clause”	   of	   section	   23(1)(b)	   of	   the	   Charter.	   It	   also	   argued	   that	   the	  
impugned	   provisions	   could	   not	   be	   saved	   under	   section	   1.	   The	   Court	   established	   that	   the	   minority	  
language	  educational	  rights	  found	  in	  the	  Charter	  had	  been	  adopted	  precisely	  to	  “remedy	  the	  perceived	  
defects”	  of	  Quebec’s	  language	  policy.55	  The	  remedial	  nature	  of	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter	  was	  made	  clear	  
by	   the	   use	   of	   a	   similar	   terminology	   and	   criteria	   as	   in	   the	   CFL.	   Consequently,	   the	   Court	   thought	   the	  
Charter’s	  framers	  could	  not	  have	  possibly	  believed	  the	  “defects”	  could	  be	  justifiable	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  
section	   1.	   Furthermore,	   the	  bench	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	   framers	   also	   had	  Quebec	   in	  mind	  when	   they	  
exempted	  the	  province	   from	  having	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  “mother	  tongue	  clause”	  of	  section	  23(1)(a)	   to	  
address	  its	  immigration	  concerns.	  
	  
Quebec	  Protestant	  School	  Boards	  did	  not	  significantly	  increase	  enrolment	  in	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  
schools.	  Pursuant	   to	   the	  unfavourable	  decisions	  made	  by	   lower	  courts	   in	   the	   same	  case,	   the	  National	  
Assembly	   had	   responded	   one	   year	   earlier	   with	  An	   Act	   to	   amend	   the	   Charter	   of	   the	   French	   Language,	  
1983,56	  also	  known	  as	  “Bill	  57.”	  Its	  purpose	  was	  to	  consolidate	  the	  special	  status	  and	  rights	  of	  the	  Quebec	  
Anglophone	  community.	  To	  begin,	  Bill	  57	  widened	  the	  admission	  criteria	  for	  English	  instruction	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54[1984]	  2	  SCR	  66,	  10	  DLR	  (4th)	  321	  [Quebec	  Protestant	  School	  Boards	  cited	  to	  SCR].	  
55Ibid	  at	  79.	  
56SQ	  1983,	  c	  56,	  amending	  CFL,	  supra	  note	  30.	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introduction	  of	  the	  “major	  part”	  requirement.57	  The	  new	  law	  provided	  that	  children	  whose	  parents	  had	  
received	  the	  “major	  part”	  of	  their	  primary	  education	  in	  English	   in	  Quebec	  would	  have	  access	  to	  public	  
English	   instruction.58	  Prior	   to	   this	   amendment,	   the	   “Quebec	   clause”	   had	   been	   interpreted	   by	   the	  
governmental	   admissibility	   bureau	   as	   guaranteeing	   access	   to	   English	   schools	   only	   to	   children	   whose	  
parents	  had	   received	   the	  “totality”	  of	   their	  primary	   instruction	   in	  English	   in	  Quebec,	  while	   the	  appeal	  
commission	  was	  applying	  the	  “major	  part”	  requirement.59	  The	  Quebec	  government	  decided	  to	  resolve	  
the	   conflict	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   Anglophone	   community,	   which	   wanted	   to	   increase	   eligibility	   to	   English	  
schools.60	  
	  
	   Furthermore,	   Bill	   57	   accepted	   the	   “Canada	   clause,”	   but	   imposed	   two	   limits	   on	   it.61	  Since	   the	  
enactment	   of	   the	   CFL,	   the	   government	   had	   constantly	   given	   certificates	   of	   exemption	   to	   allow	  
Canadians	   who	   had	   received	   their	   education	   in	   English	   outside	   of	   Quebec	   to	   send	   their	   children	   to	  
publicly-­‐funded	  English	  school,	  thereby	  informally	  enforcing	  the	  “Canada	  clause.”62	  Bill	  57	  first	  legalised	  
this	  practice,	  but	  kept	  it	  discretionary	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  guaranteed	  objective	  right.63	  Second,	  it	  added	  the	  
requirement	   that	   to	   qualify,	   parents	   had	   to	   have	   received	   their	   English	   instruction	   in	   a	   province	   that	  
offered	  instruction	  to	  Francophones,	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  offered	  to	  Anglophones	  in	  Quebec.64	  At	  the	  time,	  
most	   Canadian	   provinces	   had	   underdeveloped	   educational	   systems	   for	   Francophone	  minorities65	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1983	  c	  56,	  s	  73(a),	  s	  73(b),	  s	  86.1(a).	  
58Ibid,	  s	  73(a).	  
59Quebec,	  Assemblée	  nationale,	  Commissions	  parlementaires,	  32nd	  Leg,	  4th	  Sess,	  vol	  27,	  No	  178-­‐202	  (13	  
December	  1983)	  at	  B-­‐10876	  (Camille	  Laurin).	  
60Ibid.	  
61CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1983	  c	  56,	  s	  86.1.	  
62See	  Edward	  McWhinney,	  Canada	  and	  the	  Constitution,	  1979-­‐1982:	  Patriation	  and	  the	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  (Toronto:	  
University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  1982)	  at	  96.	  	  
63CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1983	  c	  56,	  s	  86.1.	  
64Ibid.	  
65Michael	  D	  Behiels,	  Canada’s	  Francophone	  Minority	  Communities:	  Constitutional	  Renewal	  and	  the	  Winning	  of	  
School	  Governance	  (Montreal,	  Ithaca:	  McGill-­‐Queen's	  University	  Press,	  2004).	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only	  New-­‐Brunswick	  was	  deemed	  to	  provide	  adequate	  minority	  language	  education.66	  Though	  in	  theory,	  
the	  amendment	  allowed	  the	  Quebec	  government	  to	  refuse	  public	  English	  instruction	  to	  the	  children	  of	  
out-­‐of-­‐province	   Anglophone	   Canadians,	   more	   importantly	   it	   allowed	   the	   Quebec	   government	   to	  
pressure	  other	  Canadian	  provinces	  to	  develop	  better	  services	  for	  Francophones	  outside	  Quebec.67	  
	  
	   Finally	  in	  1983,	  Bill	  57	  attempted	  to	  immunise	  the	  CFL	  from	  future	  legal	  challenges	  by	  amending	  
it	  to	  include	  a	  standard	  override	  provision.68	  However,	  the	  notwithstanding	  clause	  could	  not	  be	  invoked	  
by	  the	  Quebec	  government	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Quebec	  Protestant	  School	  Boards	  since	  section	  23	  is	  shielded	  
from	  its	  prerogative.	  It	  would	  be	  used	  later	  in	  response	  to	  cases	  pertaining	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression.	  
	  
B. Ford	  v.	  Quebec	  (1988)	  and	  Devine	  v.	  Quebec	  (1988)	  
	  
The	   CFL’s	   legislative	   scheme	   pertaining	   to	   the	   language	   of	   commerce	   and	   business	   was	   also	  
challenged	   before	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Ford	   v.	   Quebec(AG)69	  and	   Devine	   v.	   Quebec(AG).70	  In	   Ford,	  
Section	   58	  which	   required	   public	   signs	   and	   posters,	   as	  well	   as	   commercial	   advertising	   to	   be	   solely	   in	  
French	  and	  section	  69	  which	  mandated	  firms	  to	  use	  exclusively	  the	  French	  version	  of	  their	  names	  in	  the	  
province	  were	  found	  to	  violate	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression	  guaranteed	  by	  section	  2(b)	  of	  the	  Charter.	  In	  
Devine,	   sections	  59,	  60	  and	  61,71	  which	  created	  exceptions	   to	  section	  58,	  were	  also	   found	  to	  be	  of	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66RRQ	  1984,	  c	  C-­‐11,	  r	  2.	  
67At	  St	  Andrews	  in	  1977,	  Quebec	  Premier	  René	  Lévesque	  was	  willing	  to	  formally	  implement	  the	  “Canada	  clause”	  if	  
the	  English-­‐speaking	  provinces	  would	  reciprocate	  by	  guaranteeing	  access	  to	  French	  schools	  to	  Quebeckers	  leaving	  
the	  province.	  See	  McWhinney,	  supra	  note	  62	  at	  51;	  Proulx,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  124.	  
68CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1983	  c	  56.	  
69[1988]	  2	  SCR	  712,	  54	  DLR	  (4th)	  577	  [Ford	  cited	  to	  SCR].	  
70[1988]	  2	  SCR	  790,	  55	  DLR	  (4th)	  641.	  
71CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  ss	  59-­‐61	  read	  as	  follows:	  “59)	  Section	  58	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  advertising	  carried	  in	  news	  media	  
that	  publish	  a	  language	  other	  than	  French,	  or	  to	  messages	  of	  a	  religious,	  political,	  ideological	  or	  humanitarian	  nature,	  
if	  not	  for	  a	  profit	  motive.	  60)	  Firms	  employing	  not	  over	  four	  persons	  including	  the	  employer	  may	  erect	  signs	  and	  
posters	  in	  both	  French	  and	  another	  language	  in	  their	  establishments.	  However,	  the	  inscriptions	  in	  French	  must	  be	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force	   or	   effect	   since	   they	   were	   connected	   to	   the	   general	   rule	   found	   in	   section	   58.	   The	   CFL’s	   only	  
provisions	  to	  have	  escaped	  judicial	  invalidation	  under	  the	  Charter	  were	  sections	  5272	  and	  57,73	  since	  they	  
permitted	  the	  use	  of	  French	  together	  with	  another	  language,	  when	  read	  with	  section	  89.74	  In	  addition,	  
the	  Court	  declared	   that	   the	  CFL	  was	  only	  partly	  protected	   from	   the	  application	  of	   section	  2(b)	  of	   the	  
Charter	  by	  the	  standard	  override	  provision	  that	  had	  been	  adopted	  earlier.	  
	  
In	  Ford,	   the	   bench	   found	   that	   the	   constitutional	   freedom	  of	   expression	   included	   “the	   freedom	   to	  
express	  oneself	  in	  the	  language	  of	  one's	  choice”:	  
	  
Language	   is	   so	   intimately	   related	   to	   the	   form	   and	   content	   of	   expression	   that	   there	   cannot	   be	   true	  
freedom	   of	   expression	   by	   means	   of	   language	   if	   one	   is	   prohibited	   from	   using	   the	   language	   of	   one's	  
choice.	  Language	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  means	  or	  medium	  of	  expression;	  it	  colours	  the	  content	  and	  meaning	  of	  
expression.	   It	   is,	   as	   the	   preamble	   of	   the	  Charter	   of	   the	   French	   Language	   itself	   indicates,	   a	  means	   by	  
which	  a	  people	  may	  express	  its	  cultural	  identity.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  means	  by	  which	  the	  individual	  expresses	  his	  
or	  her	  personal	  identity	  and	  sense	  of	  individuality.75	  
	  
Freedom	  of	  expression	  was	  also	  extended	  to	  commercial	  expression.	  In	  RWDSU	  v.	  Dolphin	  Delivery	  Ltd,76	  
the	   Court	   had	   already	   established	   that	   freedom	   of	   expression	   protected	   by	   the	   Charter	  went	   beyond	  
political	  expression.	  Adopting	  a	  purposive	  approach,	  it	  decided	  that	  commercial	  expression	  played	  a	  key	  
role	  in	  a	  free	  and	  democratic	  society,	  that	  of	  “enabling	  individuals	  to	  make	  informed	  economic	  choices,	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
given	  at	  least	  as	  prominent	  display	  as	  those	  in	  the	  other	  language.	  61)	  Signs	  and	  posters	  respecting	  cultural	  activities	  
of	  a	  particular	  ethnic	  group	  in	  any	  way	  may	  be	  in	  both	  French	  and	  the	  language	  of	  that	  ethnic	  group”.	  
72CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  s	  52	  reads	  as	  follows:	  “Catalogues,	  brochures,	  folders	  and	  any	  similar	  publications	  must	  be	  
drawn	  up	  in	  French”.	  
73CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  s	  57	  reads	  as	  follows:	  “Application	  forms	  for	  employment,	  order	  forms,	  invoices,	  receipts	  and	  
quittances	  shall	  be	  drawn	  up	  in	  French”.	  
74CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  s	  89	  reads	  as	  follows:	  “Where	  this	  act	  does	  not	  require	  the	  use	  of	  the	  official	  language	  
exclusively,	  the	  official	  language	  and	  another	  language	  may	  be	  used	  together”.	  
75Ford,	  supra	  note	  69	  at	  para	  	  40.	  
76[1986]	  2	  SCR	  573,	  9	  BCLR	  (2d)	  273.	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important	  aspect	  of	  individual	  self-­‐fulfillment	  and	  personal	  autonomy.”77	  So	  while	  freedom	  of	  expression	  
generally	   could	   be	   justified	   according	   to	   the	   benefits	   it	   conferred	   to	   the	   speaker,	   its	   extension	   to	  
commercial	  expression	  would	  be	  justified	  by	  the	  benefits	  it	  conferred	  to	  the	  listeners.	  
	  
However,	   extending	   the	   freedom	   of	   expression	   to	   include	   commercial	   expression	   was	   seen	   as	  
problematic	   by	   the	   Attorney	  General	   of	  Quebec	   for	  multiple	   reasons.	   To	   begin,	   he	   argued	   that	   since	  
freedom	  of	  expression	  was	  listed	  under	  fundamental	  freedoms	  in	  the	  Charter	  it	  had	  to	  be	  fundamental.	  
But	  according	  to	  him,	  commercial	  expression	  was	  not	  considered	  fundamental.	  The	  Attorney	  General	  of	  
Quebec	  criticized	  as	  well	  that	  the	  Court’s	  interpretation	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  which	  recognized	  a	  de	  
facto	   economic	   right,	   even	   though	   the	   framers	   of	   the	   Charter	   did	   not	   intend	   this.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
Attorney	   General	   of	   Quebec	   contended	   that	   no	   grounds	   existed	   for	   constitutionally	   protecting	  
commercial	  advertising	  in	  particular,	  since	  its	  main	  goal	  was	  to	  condition	  economic	  choices	  rather	  than	  
truly	   informing	   those	   choices.	   Finally,	   the	   American	   experience	   had	   shown	   that	   even	   a	   limited	  
recognition	  of	  the	  right	  to	  commercial	  expression	  required	  policy	  evaluation	  that	  was	  a	  prerogative	  of	  
the	  parliament	  and	  not	  of	  the	  courts.	  
	  
In	   Ford,	   the	   real	   test	   was	   in	   deciding	   whether	   the	   CFL’s	   violation	   of	   section	   2(b)	   of	   the	   Charter	  
constituted	  a	  reasonable	   limit	   in	  accordance	  with	  section	  1.	  Following	  the	  Oakes	   test,	  the	  Court	  agreed	  
that	  the	  CFL’s	  stated	  objective	  to	  protect	  the	  quality	  and	  influence	  of	  the	  French	  language	  was	  serious	  and	  
legitimate	  due	  to	  its	  endangered	  status	  in	  the	  province:	  
	  
The	  causal	  factors	  for	  the	  threatened	  position	  of	  the	  French	  language	  that	  have	  generally	  been	  identified	  
are:	  (a)	  the	  declining	  birth	  rate	  of	  Quebec	  francophones	  resulting	  in	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  Quebec	  francophone	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77Ford,	  supra	  note	  69	  at	  para	  59.	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proportion	  of	  the	  Canadian	  population	  as	  a	  whole;	  (b)	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  francophone	  population	  outside	  
Quebec	  as	  a	  result	  of	  assimilation;	  (c)	  the	  greater	  rate	  of	  assimilation	  of	   immigrants	  to	  Quebec	  by	  the	  
anglophone	  community	  of	  Quebec;	  and	  (d)	  the	  continuing	  dominance	  of	  English	  at	  the	  higher	  levels	  of	  
the	   economic	   sector.	   These	   factors	   have	   favoured	   the	   use	   of	   the	   English	   language	   despite	   the	  
predominance	  in	  Quebec	  of	  a	  francophone	  population.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  
legislation	   at	   issue,	   the	   "visage	   linguistique"	   of	   Quebec	   often	   gave	   the	   impression	   that	   English	   had	  
become	  as	  significant	  as	  French.	  This	  "visage	  linguistique"	  reinforced	  the	  concern	  among	  francophones	  
that	   English	   was	   gaining	   in	   importance,	   that	   the	   French	   language	  was	   threatened	   and	   that	   it	   would	  
ultimately	  disappear.	   It	  strongly	  suggested	  to	  young	  and	  ambitious	  francophones	  that	  the	   language	  of	  
success	  was	  almost	  exclusively	   English.	   It	   confirmed	   to	  anglophones	   that	   there	  was	  no	  great	  need	   to	  
learn	  the	  majority	   language.	  And	  it	  suggested	  to	  immigrants	  that	  the	  prudent	  course	  lay	  in	  joining	  the	  
anglophone	  community.78	  
	  
The	  Court	  also	  recognized	  that	  taking	  measures,	  such	  as	  signage	  regulations,	   to	  protect	  Quebec's	  “visage	  
linguistique”	   were	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   the	   predominance	   of	   French	   in	   the	   province.	   However,	   it	  
determined	   that	   the	   exclusive	   use	   of	   French	   in	   commercial	   advertising	   was	   neither	   a	   necessary	   nor	   a	  
proportionate	  means	  to	  achieve	  the	  law’s	  objective.	  As	  the	  Court	  explained,	  the	  Quebec	  government	  could	  
have	  made	  the	  use	  of	  other	   languages	  conditional	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  French	  or	  required	  that	  French	  be	  
accorded	  greater	  visibility	  than	  other	  languages.	  
	  
While	  the	  blanket	  override	  used	  in	  An	  Act	  respecting	  the	  Constitution	  Act,	  1982	  had	  expired	  when	  the	  
Ford	  and	  Devine	  cases	  appeared	  before	   the	  Supreme	  Court,79	  the	  one	  contained	   in	  An	  Act	   to	  amend	   the	  
Charter	   of	   the	   French	   Language,	   1983	   had	   not.	   After	   ruling	   on	   the	   validity	   of	   that	   standard	   override	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78Ibid	  at	  para	  72	  [emphasis	  in	  the	  original].	  
79	  Even	  though	  the	  blanket	  override	  contained	  in	  An	  Act	  respecting	  the	  Constitution	  Act,	  1982	  was	  expired,	  the	  Court	  
pronounced	  itself	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  its	  application	  in	  conformity	  with	  section	  33	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  Ford.	  It	  was	  decided	  
that	  in	  general,	  section	  33	  only	  allows	  for	  prospective	  derogation	  and	  not	  for	  retrospective	  derogation	  of	  rights	  
protected	  by	  the	  Charter.	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provision,	  the	  Court	  established	  sections	  58	  and	  52	  of	  the	  CFL	  were	  saved	  but	  not	  sections	  57,	  59	  to	  61	  and	  
69,	  to	  which	  it	  did	  not	  apply.	  But	  since	  the	  judges	  found	  all	  the	  impugned	  provisions	  infringed	  the	  freedom	  
of	  expression	  guaranteed	  by	  section	  3	  the	  Quebec	  Charter	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms80(hereinafter	  the	  
“Quebec	   Charter”),	   they	   were	   all	   invalidated.	   Ford	   and	   Devine	   thus	   suggest	   that	   the	   Quebec	   Charter,	  
without	   having	   a	   formal	   constitutional	   status,	   could	   also	   prevent	   Quebec	   from	   protecting	   its	   common	  
language	  and	  collective	  culture	  due	  to	  the	  similar	  individualistic	  nature	  of	  some	  of	  its	  rights	  provisions.	  
	  
While	   Ford	   and	   Devine	   signified	   advancement	   of	   the	   individual	   freedom	   of	   expression	   for	   all	  
Quebeckers,	  in	  reality	  they	  mostly	  benefited	  the	  Anglophone	  minority	  whose	  members	  brought	  the	  cases	  
before	  the	  Court.81	  Although	  those	  judgments	  reduced	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  CFL,	  they	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  have	  
shown	  a	  total	  disregard	  for	   its	  cultural	  objective.82	  In	  a	   fine	  act	  of	  rights	  balancing,	   the	  Court	  was	  able	  to	  
simultaneously	   uphold	   Quebec’s	   self-­‐governing	   right	   to	   protect	   its	   “visage	   linguistique,”	   and	   the	   Anglo-­‐
community’s	   group-­‐differentiated	   right	   to	   function	   in	   its	  own	   language	   in	   its	  everyday	   life.	  However,	   the	  
rights	  compromise	  reached	  by	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  fare	  well	  amongst	  nationalist	  French-­‐Quebeckers,	  and	  even	  
outraged	  many	  of	  them.83	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  Ford	  and	  Devine,	  Robert	  Bourassa,	  then	  Premier	  of	  Quebec,	  passed	  An	  Act	  to	  amend	  
the	  Charter	  of	  the	  French	  language,	  1988,84	  also	  known	  as	  “Bill	  178”.	  This	  piece	  of	  legislation	  referred	  to	  
as	  the	  “inside-­‐outside”	  law,	  allowed	  for	  bilingual	  advertisement	  inside	  commercial	  establishments	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80RSQ,	  c	  C-­‐12.	  
81See	  e.g.	  Jean	  Claude	  Galipeau,	  “National	  Minorities,	  Rights	  and	  Signs:	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  Language	  
Legislation	  in	  Quebec”	  in	  Alain	  Gagnon	  &	  Brian	  Tanguay,	  eds,	  Democracy	  with	  Justice:	  Essays	  in	  Honour	  of	  
Khayyam	  Zev	  Paltiel	  (Ottawa:	  Carleton	  University	  Press,	  1992)	  66.	  
82David	  R	  Cameron	  &	  Jacqueline	  D	  Krikorian,	  “Recognizing	  Quebec	  in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Canada:	  Using	  the	  
Bilateral	  Constitutional	  Amendment	  Process”	  (2008)	  58:4	  UTLJ	  389.	  
83Peter	  H	  Russell,	  “Constitutional	  Odyssey:	  Can	  Canadians	  Become	  a	  Sovereign	  People?”	  (Toronto:	  University	  of	  
Toronto	  Press,	  2004)	  at	  145.	  
84CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1988,	  c	  54.	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French	   preserving	   a	   marked	   predominance,	   but	   required	   the	   exclusive	   use	   of	   French	   on	   all	   exterior	  
commercial	   signs.	   Because	   the	   new	   law	   went	   against	   the	   verdicts	   given	   in	   Ford	   and	   Devine,	   the	  
government	  of	  Quebec	  made	  use	  of	  the	  notwithstanding	  clause	  found	  in	  both	  the	  federal	  and	  provincial	  
charters.	   By	   enacting	   Bill	   178,	   the	   Quebec	   government	   decided	   to	   affirm	   its	   self-­‐governing	   right	   in	  
language	  policy	  matters.	  Even	  though	  the	  Anglophone	  minority	  had	  made	  minor	  gains	  under	  Bill	  178,	  it	  
was	  seen	  as	  a	  setback	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  rights	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  granted	  them.	  Ironically,	  the	  use	  of	  
the	  legislative	  override	  backfired	  and	  created	  uproar	   in	  the	  Rest	  of	  Canada	  (hereinafter	  “ROC”).	   It	  also	  
led	   to	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   Meech	   Lake	   Accord,	   which	   would	   have	   recognized	   Quebec	   as	   a	   “distinct	  
society”	   and	   eventually	   put	   an	   end	   to	   the	   weakening	   of	   its	   language	   policy	   through	   constitutional	  
litigation.85	  
	  
Before	  the	  5-­‐year	  derogation	  expired,	  the	  National	  Assembly	  passed	  An	  Act	  to	  amend	  the	  Charter	  of	  
the	  French	  language,	  1993,86	  also	  known	  as	  “Bill	  86”,	  which	  conformed	  to	  Ford	  and	  Devine	  by	  allowing	  
for	  bilingual	  interior	  and	  exterior	  commercial	  signs	  with	  a	  marked	  predominance	  of	  French.87	  Bill	  86	  also	  
amended	   the	   CFL	   to	   have	   the	   “Canada	   clause”	   officially	   recognized,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   quality	   of	  
francophone	  minority	  instruction	  services	  in	  other	  Canadian	  provinces.88	  The	  amendment	  also	  extended	  
the	   “major	   part”	   requirement	   to	   section	   23(2)	   of	   the	  Charter	   right	   holders	   by	   providing	   that	   “a	   child	  
whose	   father	   or	   mother	   is	   a	   Canadian	   citizen	   and	   who	   has	   received	   or	   is	   receiving	   elementary	   or	  
secondary	  instruction	  in	  English	  in	  Canada,	  and	  the	  brothers	  and	  sisters	  of	  that	  child,	  provided	  that	  that	  
instruction	  constitutes	  the	  major	  part	  of	  the	  elementary	  or	  secondary	  instruction	  received	  by	  the	  child	  in	  
Canada”	   is	   eligible	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   school.89	  By	   not	   requiring	   that	   the	   “totality”	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85See	  e.g.	  Patrick	  Monahan,	  Meech	  Lake:	  The	  inside	  Story	  (Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  1991).	  
86SQ	  1993,	  c	  40.	  
87CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1993,	  c	  40,	  s	  58.	  
88Ibid,	  s	  73(1).	  
89Ibid,	  s	  73(2).	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education	  be	  received	   in	  the	  minority	   language,	  Quebec's	  articulation	  of	  the	  “continuity	  of	  education”	  
Charter	   clause	   widened	   the	   criteria	   of	   eligibility	   to	   public	   English	   instruction.	   Although	   aware	   of	  
potential	   subterfuges,	   the	   government	   thought	   it	   unlikely	   that	   this	   modification	   could	   lead	   to	   a	  
subterfuge	  whereby	  wealthy	   Francophone	   or	   Allophone	   Quebeckers	   would	   send	   their	   children	   to	   an	  
English	   school	   in	   nearby	   Ontario	   for	   the	   first	   year	   of	   their	   primary	   school	   in	   order	   to	   automatically	  
acquire	  a	  right	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  instruction	  in	  Quebec.90	  
	  
These	  policy	  amendments	  to	  the	  CFL	  showed	  that	  Quebecers’	  mindset	  was	  changing	  and	  indicated	  
that	   a	   certain	   linguistic	   peace	   in	   the	   province	   was	   possible	   through	   compromise.91	  Even	   though	   the	  
Quebec	  government	  had	   to	  make	  concessions	   to	  members	  of	   the	  Anglophone	  community,	   it	   retained	  
the	  power	  to	  integrate	  immigrants	  in	  the	  public	  French	  culture	  and	  ensure	  its	  preservation	  on	  the	  long	  
term.	   In	   that	   sense,	   Quebec	   was	   able	   to	   continue	   to	   pursue	   its	   ideal	   of	   a	   multinational	   Canadian	  
citizenship,	  albeit	  with	  reduced	  means.	  
	  
III. Recent	  Language	  Rights	  Jurisprudence:	  The	  Legal	  Armistice	  Challenged	  
	  
After	  more	   than	  a	  decade	  of	   legal	  armistice	  on	  Quebec's	   language	   front,	   the	  CFL	  was	  once	  again	  
challenged	   under	   the	   Charter.	   This	   time	   however,	   it	   was	   not	   challenged	   by	   Quebec’s	   historical	  
Anglophone	   community,	   but	   by	   individual	   members	   of	   the	   Francophone	   community92	  and	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Quebec,	  National	  Assembly,	  Commission	  permanente	  de	  la	  culture,	  34th	  Leg,	  2nd	  Sess,	  Fascicule	  No	  26	  (20	  May	  
1993)	  at	  957-­‐80	  (Claude	  Ryan),	  online:	  Nationale	  Assembly<http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-­‐
parlementaires/journaux-­‐debats/index-­‐
jd/recherche.html?cat=ex&Session=jd34l2se&Section=projlois&Requete=CC+957-­‐80&Hier=86+-­‐
+Loi+modifiant+la+Charte+de+la+langue+fran%C3%A7aise+(1993)_Audition+publique_CC+957-­‐80>	  .	  	  
91José	  Woehrling,	  “La	  Charte	  de	  la	  langue	  française:	  Les	  ajustements	  juridiques”	  in	  Michel	  Plourde,	  ed,	  with	  the	  
collaboration	  of	  Hélène	  Duval	  &	  Pierre	  Georgeaults,	  Le	  français	  au	  Québec:	  400	  ans	  d'histoire	  et	  de	  vie	  (Saint-­‐
Laurent:	  Fides,	  2000)	  354.	  
92Gosselin,	  supra	  note	  7;	  Solski,	  supra	  note	  8.	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Allophone	   community. 93 	  As	   will	   be	   discussed,	   these	   challenges	   have	   undermined	   Quebec's	   self-­‐
government	  rights	  and	  brought	  about	  a	  greater	  undifferentiation	  of	  Canadian	  citizenship.	  
	  
A. Gosselin	  v.	  Quebec	  (2005)	  
	  
In	  Gosselin,	  section	  73	  of	  the	  CFL	  once	  again	  came	  under	  attack.	  This	  time,	  Francophone	  parents94	  
who	  did	  not	  qualify	  as	  rights	  holders	  under	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter	  were	  claiming	  that	  section	  73	  was	  
discriminatory	   towards	   the	  majority	   of	   French-­‐speaking	   children	   by	   refusing	   them	   access	   to	   publicly-­‐
funded	  English	   instruction	  and	  by	  denying,	   in	   general,	   freedom	  of	   choice	  with	   regards	   to	   language	  of	  
instruction	   in	  Quebec.	  The	  appellants	  contended	  that	   the	  CFL	  violated	  the	  equality	   rights	  protected	   in	  
the	  Quebec	  Charter.	  Even	  though	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  dismissed	  their	  appeal	  under	  the	  provincial	  charter,	  it	  
judged	  necessary	  to	  assess	  whether	  such	  a	  challenge	  should	  also	  be	  dismissed	  under	  the	  federal	  one.	  In	  
a	   unanimous	   decision,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   CFL	   did	   not	   infringe	   the	   equality	   rights	   protected	   in	  
section	  15	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Charter.	  	  
	  
Even	  though	  “maternal	   language”	  had	  been	  recognized	  as	  an	  analogous	  ground	  for	  discrimination	  
under	  section	  15	  of	  the	  Charter	  by	  the	  Quebec	  Superior	  Court	  in	  Quebec	  v.	  Les	  Entreprises	  W.F.H.	  ltée,95	  
the	  justices	  considered	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  content	  of	  section	  15	  that	  was	  at	  stake	  in	  Gosselin	  but	  rather	  
its	   relationship	  with	   the	  positive	   language	  guarantees	  given	   to	  minorities	   in	   section	  23	  of	   the	  Charter	  
and	  section	  73	  of	  the	  CFL.	  Similarly	  to	  Mahe	  v.	  Alberta,96	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  universal	  individual	  rights	  
such	  as	  those	  found	  in	  section	  15	  of	  the	  Charter	  could	  not	  be	  invoked	  to	  nullify	  the	  special	  status	  given	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93Solski,	  supra	  note	  8;	  Nguyen,	  supra	  note	  9.	  
94	  Out	  of	  the	  sixteen	  appellants	  in	  Gosselin,	  only	  two	  had	  not	  been	  born	  in	  Quebec	  and	  had	  not	  received	  their	  
primary	  education	  in	  French;	  Gosselin,	  supra	  note	  7	  at	  para	  3.	  
95[2000]	  RJQ	  1222,	  JE	  2000-­‐860	  (CS).	  
96[1990]	  1	  SCR	  342,	  68	  DLR	  (4th)	  69	  [Mahe	  cited	  to	  SCR].	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to	  the	  English	  and	  French	  groups	  protected	  by	  sections	  such	  as	  section	  23.	  Furthermore,	  it	  found	  as	  in	  
Arsenault-­‐Cameron	   v.	   Prince	   Edward	   Island,	   that	   special	   treatment	   given	   to	   linguistic	   minorities	   in	  
section	   23	   was	   not	   an	   exception	   to	   section	   15:	   it	   was	   not	   a	   violation	   of	   equality,	   but	   rather	   the	  
application	  of	  substantive	  equality.97	  The	  Court	  thus	  established	  that	  there	  was	  not	  a	  hierarchy	  amongst	  
constitutional	  rights	  and	  that	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Charter	  had	  to	  be	  understood	  comprehensively.	  
	  
The	   Court	   also	   argued	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   freedom	   of	   choice	   with	   regards	   to	   language	   of	  
instruction	  was	  not	  supposed	  to	  be	  recognized	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  section	  23	  according	  to	  the	  Charter’s	  
framers.	  The	  framers	  were	  concerned	  that	  giving	  members	  of	  the	  linguistic	  majority	  access	  to	  minority	  
language	   schooling,	   especially	   outside	   Quebec,	   would	   transform	   minority	   language	   schools	   into	  
“assimilation	  centers”	  where	  members	  of	  the	  majority	  would	  outnumber	  members	  of	  the	  minority.98	  In	  
the	   Quebec	   context,	   the	   framers	   were	   additionally	   worried	   that	   such	   a	   policy	   would	   “operate	   to	  
undermine	   the	   desire	   of	   the	   majority	   to	   protect	   and	   enhance	   French	   as	   the	   majority	   language	   in	  
Quebec,	   knowing	   that	   it	   will	   remain	   the	   minority	   language	   in	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   Canada	   as	   a	  
whole.”99	  Since	   section	   73	   of	   the	   CFL	   as	   amended	   in	   1993	   was	   the	   legislative	   articulation	   of	   the	  
constitutional	   right	   found	   in	   section	   23	   of	   the	   Charter,	   the	   Court	   argued	   it	   could	   not	   be	   opposed	   to	  
section	  15	  of	  the	  Charter.	  
 
Gosselin	  resulted	  in	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  legislative	  status	  quo.	  Graham	  Fraser	  believes	  the	  case	  
demonstrated	  that	  the	  Charter	   is	  sensitive	  both	  to	  Quebec’s	  desire	  to	  retain	  control	  over	  its	  education	  
policy	   and	   to	   the	   rights	   of	   linguistic	   minorities	   to	   thrive.100	  However,	   the	   Court	   justified	   its	   decision	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
972000	  SCC	  1,	  [2000]	  1	  SCR	  3.	  
98Gosselin,	  supra	  note	  7	  at	  para	  31.	  
99Ibid	  at	  para	  31.	  
100Graham	  Fraser,	  “Canadian	  Language	  Rights:	  Liberties,	  Claims,	  and	  the	  National	  Conversation”	  in	  Christopher	  P	  
Manfredi	  &	  James	  B	  Kelly,	  eds,	  Contested	  Constitutionalism:	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  on	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  
Freedoms(Vancouver:	  UBC	  Press,	  2009)	  167.	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mainly	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  impugned	  provision	  of	  the	  CFL	  was	  protecting	  the	  group-­‐differentiated	  right	  
of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Anglophone	  community	  in	  Quebec,	  and	  indirectly	  the	  group-­‐differentiated	  right	  
of	  the	  members	  of	  Francophone	  communities	  outside	  Quebec,	  rather	  than	  the	  National	  Assembly’s	  self-­‐
government	   right.	  Even	   though	   the	  Gosselin	   ruling	  played	   in	   favour	  of	  Quebec,	   it	   can	  me	  asked	   if	   the	  
parallel	   jurisprudential	   treatment	   of	   Francophone	   and	  Anglophone	   linguistic	  minorities	   in	   Canada	   can	  
undermine	  the	  vitality	  of	  French	  in	  Quebec	  in	  other	  instances.	  
	  
B. Solski	  v.	  Quebec	  (2005)	  
	  
Members	  of	   the	   linguistic	  French	  majority	  and	  members	  of	   the	  Allophone	  community	  were	  more	  
successful	  in	  challenging	  the	  CFL	  under	  the	  Charter	  in	  Solski.	  At	  issue	  was	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  section	  
73(2)	  of	   the	  CFL,	  which	  specifies	   that	  only	   the	  children	  who	  have	  completed	  the	  “major	  part”	  of	   their	  
education	  in	  English	  should	  have	  access	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  education	  in	  English.	  In	  the	  appellants’	  view,	  
this	  provision	  violated	  section	  23(2)	  of	  the	  Charter,	  which	  provides	  that	  “[c]itizens	  of	  Canada	  of	  whom	  
any	   child	   has	   received	   or	   is	   receiving	   primary	   or	   secondary	   school	   instruction	   in	   English	   or	   French	   in	  
Canada,	  have	  the	  right	  to	  have	  all	  their	  children	  receive	  primary	  and	  secondary	  school	  instruction	  in	  the	  
same	  language.”101	  In	  a	  unanimous	  decision,	  the	  bench	  concluded	  that	  section	  73(2)	  of	  the	  CFL	  did	  not	  
infringe	  the	  rights	  protected	  in	  section	  23(2)	  of	  the	  Charter	  when	  properly	  interpreted	  and	  determined	  
that	  the	  appellants	  should	  have	  qualified	  for	  instruction	  in	  a	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  school.	  
To	  determine	  whether	  a	  child	  had	  completed	  the	  “major	  part”	  of	  his	  or	  her	  education	   in	  English,	  
the	   Quebec	   government	   would	   simply	   calculate	   if	   the	   child	   had	   spent	   more	   months	   in	   the	   English	  
schooling	   system	   than	   in	   the	   French	   one.	   The	   authorities	   would	   also	   apply	   the	   “major	   part”	   criteria	  
disjunctively,	  considering	  the	  time	  spent	  at	  the	  elementary	  level	  separately	  from	  the	  time	  spent	  at	  the	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  supra	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  1,	  s	  23(2).	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secondary	   level.	   In	   the	   Court’s	   view,	   this	   strictly	   mathematical	   interpretation	   of	   the	   “major	   part”	  
requirement	  was	  incompatible	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  section	  23(2)	  of	  the	  Charter.	  The	  Court	  believed	  the	  
framers	   of	   the	   Charter	   intended	   for	   this	   guarantee	   to	   “provide	   continuity	   of	   minority	   language	  
education	  rights,	  to	  accommodate	  mobility	  and	  to	  ensure	  family	  unity.”102	  Section	  23(2)	  did	  not	  specify	  
the	   time	   a	   child	   had	   to	   spend	   in	   a	   minority	   language	   school	   system	   in	   order	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	  
constitutional	  guarantee.	  	  
Rather,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   section	   23(2)	   required	   for	   the	   child	   to	   have	   a	   sufficient	   connection	  
with	  the	  language	  of	  the	  minority	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  child	  needed	  to	  have	  spent	  a	  “significant	  part”	  of	  
his	   educational	   pathway	   in	   the	   language	   of	   the	   minority.	   Furthermore,	   this	   connection	   had	   to	   be	  
assessed	  both	  subjectively	  and	  objectively.	  The	  Quebec	  government	  would	  need	   to	  ask:	  “Subjectively,	  
do	  the	  circumstances	  show	  an	  intention	  to	  adopt	  the	  minority	  language	  as	  the	  language	  of	  instruction?	  
Objectively,	   do	   the	   educational	   experiences	   and	   choices	   to	   date	   support	   such	   a	   connection?”103	  The	  
Court	   thus	   preferred	   a	   qualitative	   evaluation	   of	   a	   pupil’s	   genuine	   commitment	   to	  minority	   language	  
instruction,	   that	  would	   take	   into	   account	   notably	   “the	   time	   spent	   in	   each	   program,	   at	  what	   stage	   of	  
education	   the	   choice	  of	   language	  of	   instruction	  was	  made,	  what	  programs	  are	  or	  were	  available,	   and	  
whether	   learning	   disabilities	   or	   other	   difficulties	   exist.”104	  Only	   by	   adopting	   such	   an	   approach	   would	  
section	  73(2)	  of	  the	  CFL	  be	  considered	  constitutional.105	  The	  Quebec	  government’s	  compliance	  with	  the	  
“significant	  part”	  approach	  was	  officialised	  by	  regulation	  in	  2010.106	  	  
Solski	   also	   tackled	   the	   question	   of	   immersion	   programs	   and	   determined	   whether	   they	   could	   be	  
equated	  with	  minority	  language	  education	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  section	  23(2)	  of	  the	  Charter.	  Because	  she	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102Solski,	  supra	  note	  8	  at	  para	  30.	  
103Ibid	  at	  para	  40.	  
104Ibid	  at	  para	  33.	  
105Contra	  Peter	  W.	  Hogg,	  Constitutional	  Law	  of	  Canada,	  2013	  Student	  Edition	  (Toronto:	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  2010,	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had	  not	  received	  the	  majority	  of	  her	  education	  in	  English,	  the	  Quebec	  government	  had	  refused	  to	  give	  
Shanning	  Casimir	  access	   to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	   school	   in	  Quebec	  after	   she	  had	  attended	  a	  French	  
immersion	   program	   in	   Ontario.	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   reversed	   this	   decision	   by	   declaring	   that	   French	  
immersion	  programs	  do	  not	  qualify	  as	  Francophone	  minority	  education.	  Casimir	  was	  thus	   found	  to	  be	  
more	  connected	  to	  the	  Anglophone	  culture	  than	  the	  Francophone	  culture:	  	  
Outside	  Quebec,	  immersion	  programs	  are	  designed	  to	  provide	  second	  language	  training	  to	  children	  
attending	  schools	  designed	  for	  those	  adopting	  the	  language	  of	  the	  majority.	  Immersion	  programs	  
occur	  in	  a	  majority	  setting	  where	  the	  majority	  language	  is	  spoken	  in	  the	  corridors	  and	  during	  extra-­‐
curricular	  activities.	  	  Immersion	  programs	  are	  run	  in	  majority	  schools	  that	  are	  a	  part	  of	  the	  majority	  
school	  system.107	  
	  
Furthermore,	   the	   justices	   in	   Solski	   specified	   that	   “[s]ection	   23(2)	   in	   particular	   facilitates	  mobility	  
and	  continuity	  of	  education	  in	  the	  minority	  language,	  though	  change	  of	  residence	  is	  not	  a	  condition	  for	  
the	   exercise	  of	   the	   right.”108	  Two	  out	  of	   the	   three	   appellant	   families	  whose	   children	  were	  deemed	   to	  
qualify	   for	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   instruction	   in	   Solski	   had	   not	   moved	   from	   a	   Canadian	   province	   to	  
Quebec.	  The	  Solski	  family	  had	  moved	  from	  Poland	  to	  Quebec	  and	  had	  been	  granted	  permission	  to	  send	  
their	  children	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  schools	  under	  the	  basis	  that	  their	  stay	  in	  Quebec	  was	  supposed	  
to	   be	   temporary.	   Finally,	   the	   family	   decided	   to	   settle	   permanently	   in	  Quebec	   and	   sought	   permanent	  
eligibility	  to	  attend	  English	  school	  for	  their	  children.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Lacroix	  family,	  one	  daughter	  had	  
completed	   her	   first	   two	   years	   of	   her	   primary	   education	   in	   private	   French	   school	   but	   had	   opted	   to	  
continue	  her	  education	  in	  an	  English	  private	  school.	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  supra	  note	  8	  at	  para	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108Solski,	  supra	  note	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  para	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By	   adopting	   a	   broad	   and	   purposive	   approach	   in	   interpreting	   the	   meaning	   of	   23(2),	   the	   Court	  
determined	   that	   this	   constitutional	   guarantee	   was	   not	   only	   for	   members	   of	   the	   official	   linguistic	  
minority	  as	  conventionally	  defined,	  but	  also	  for	  members	  of	  the	  Allophone	  community	  and	  the	  linguistic	  
majority.	  Thus	  in	  Solski,	  the	  Court	  was	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  individual	  rights	  of	  children	  in	  general	  
to	   have	   continuous	   education	   than	   with	   protecting	   Quebec’s	   self-­‐governing	   right	   to	   promote	   French	  
culture.	   However,	   even	   before	   the	   decision	   in	   Solski	   was	   delivered,	   the	   Quebec	   government	   had	  
adopted	  An	  Act	  to	  amend	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  French	  language,	  2002109	  (also	  known	  as	  “Bill	  104”)	  under	  
which	   the	   children	   of	   the	   Solski	   and	   Lacroix	   families	   would	   not	   have	   qualified	   for	   public	   English	  
instruction.	  The	  constitutionality	  of	  these	  amendments	  would	  later	  be	  assessed	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Canada	  in	  Nguyen.	  
	  
C. Nguyen	  v.	  Quebec	  (2009)	  
	  
Nguyen	   is	   the	   final	   case	   of	   a	   series	   of	   legal	   challenges	   aimed	   at	   vindicating	   minority	   language	  
education	   rights	   over	   Quebec's	   legislative	   power.	   At	   issue	   in	   Nguyen	   was	   the	   constitutionality	   of	  
paragraphs	  2	  and	  3	  of	  section	  73	  of	  the	  CFL,	  regarding	  the	  eligibility	  to	  attend	  publicly	  subsidized	  English	  
school	   in	  Quebec.	  These	  provisions	  were	  added	  by	  Bill	  104	   in	  order	  to	  counter	  the	  effects	  of	  so-­‐called	  
“bridging-­‐schools”:	   parents	   whose	   children	  were	   not	   entitled	   to	   receive	   publicly-­‐funded	   education	   in	  
English	  according	  to	  section	  23(1)	  of	  the	  Charter,	  would	  enroll	  them	  in	  unsubsidized	  English	  schools	  for	  a	  
few	  weeks	  or	  months	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   automatically	   acquiring	   the	   right	   to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English-­‐
language	  education	  for	  them	  thanks	  to	  section	  23(2).	  This	  trend	  had	  been	  increasing	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  
century,	   especially	   among	   the	   members	   of	   the	   Allophone	   community.	   Paragraph	   2	   of	   section	   73	  
establishes	   that	   time	   spent	   in	   an	   unsubsidized	   English	   school	   cannot	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   when	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determining	   if	  a	   child,	  his	   siblings	  or	  his	  descendants,	   can	  have	  access	   to	  a	  publicly	   subsidized	  English	  
school.	   Paragraph	   3	   of	   section	   73	   specifies	   that	   the	   same	   rule	   is	   applicable	   for	   schooling	   received	   in	  
English	   following	  an	  authorization	  given	  by	  the	  province	   in	  special	  cases	  where	  the	  child	  has	  a	  serious	  
learning	   disability,	   is	   temporarily	   residing	   in	   Quebec,	   or	   is	   in	   an	   exceptional	   family	   or	   humanitarian	  
situation.	   The	  Quebec	  government	  did	  not	  want	   the	   siblings	   and	   the	  descendants	  of	   those	  benefiting	  
from	  these	  exemptions	  to	  subsequently	  earn	  the	  constitutional	  right	  to	  attend	  public	  English	  school,	  due	  
to	  	  the	  circumstantial	  character	  of	  the	  exemption.110	  
	  
In	   a	   unanimous	   judgment,	   the	   Court	   decided	   that	   paragraphs	   2	   and	   3	   of	   section	   73	   of	   the	   CFL	  
infringed	   section	   23(2)	   of	   the	   Charter.	   The	   Court	   pointed	   out	   that	   this	   constitutional	   right	   does	   not	  
specify	   whether	   the	   education	   received	   or	   being	   received	   has	   to	   be	   private	   or	   public,	   nor	   does	   it	  
mention	  according	  to	  which	  type	  of	  authorization	  it	  needs	  to	  have	  been	  granted.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  
Court	  believed	  that	  section	  23(2)	  alludes	  to	  the	  factual	  instruction	  of	  a	  child	  received	  in	  one	  of	  Canada’s	  
two	  official	   languages.	   As	   Justice	   Lebel	  writing	   for	   the	   Court	   argued:	   “The	   inability	   to	   assess	   a	   child’s	  
educational	  pathway	  in	   its	  entirety	   in	  determining	  the	  extent	  of	  his	  or	  her	  educational	   language	  rights	  
has	   the	  effect	  of	   truncating	   the	  child’s	   reality	  by	  creating	  a	   fictitious	  educational	  pathway	  that	  cannot	  
serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  proper	  application	  of	  the	  constitutional	  guarantees.”111	  
	  
As	  determined	  in	  Solski,	  eligibility	  for	  instruction	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  minority	  was	  conditional	  on	  the	  
child’s	  educational	  pathway	  being	  “genuine”.	  For	  the	  Court,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  evaluation	  of	  a	  child’s	  
pathway	  had	   to	  be	   comprehensive,	   but	   also	  had	   to	   recognize	  when	  attendance	  at	   a	   school	  was	  used	  
solely	   to	   artificially	   acquire	   an	   educational	   minority	   language	   right.	   The	   judges	   acknowledged	   that	   a	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literal	  interpretation	  of	  section	  23(2)	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  return	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  choice	  of	  the	  
language	  of	  instruction	  in	  Quebec,	  which	  they	  did	  not	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  Charter’s	  drafters.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  impugned	  provisions	  of	  the	  CFL	  did	  not	  withstand	  a	  section	  
1	  analysis.	  While	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  law	  was	  found	  to	  be	  pressing	  and	  substantial,	  the	  means	  chosen	  
were	  found	  to	  be	  excessive	  under	  the	  proportionality	  requirement	  of	  the	  Oakes	  test.	  In	  Ford,	  the	  Court	  
had	  already	  recognized	  the	  importance	  for	  the	  province	  of	  Quebec	  to	  protect	  the	  French	  language	  and	  
realized	   that	   the	   “bridging-­‐schools”	   were	   compromising	   this	   objective.	   However,	   the	   Court	   thought	  
paragraphs	   2	   and	   3	   of	   section	   73	   of	   the	   CFL	   did	   not	  minimally	   impair	   the	   constitutional	   rights	   of	   the	  
appellants.	  While	   the	   number	   of	   children	   who	   become	   eligible	   for	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   education	  
after	  having	  attended	  a	  privately-­‐funded	  English	  school	  is	  increasing,	  the	  overall	  number	  remains	  low	  in	  
proportion	   to	   the	  number	  of	   children	  enrolled	   in	   the	  educational	   system	  according	   to	   the	  bench.	   For	  
that	  reason,	  Justice	  Lebel	  stated	  that	  “the	  absolute	  prohibition	  on	  considering	  an	  educational	  pathway	  
in	  [an	  unsubsidized	  private	  school]	  seem[ed]	  overly	  drastic.”112	  The	  Court	  concluded	  that	  in	  reality	  there	  
was	   not	   a	   return	   to	   freedom	   of	   choice,	   and	   that	   other	   solutions,	   such	   as	   the	   contextual	   approach	  
referred	   to	   in	   Solski,	   were	   available	   to	   Quebec’s	   national	   Assembly	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   the	  
“bridging-­‐schools”.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  paragraph	  3	  was	  found	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  preserving	  family	  unity	  
provided	  for	  in	  section	  23(2)	  of	  the	  Charter.	  In	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  one	  of	  the	  appellants	  was	  not	  able	  to	  
secure	  eligibility	  for	  instruction	  in	  English	  for	  his	  son	  even	  though	  his	  daughter	  was	  attending	  a	  school	  in	  
the	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   system	   pursuant	   to	   a	   special	   authorization.	   By	   granting	   special	  
authorizations	   to	   attend	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   schools	   to	   certain	   children,	   the	   government	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112Ibid	  at	  para	  42.	  
31	  
	  
exceeding	   its	   constitutional	   obligations.	   But	   once	   this	   was	   done,	   the	   Court	   considered	   that	   the	  
government	  could	  not	  limit	  the	  constitutional	  rights	  derived	  from	  such	  authorizations.	  
	  
Just	  like	  in	  Solski,	  in	  Nguyen	  the	  right	  of	  eligibility	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  instruction	  for	  certain	  
categories	  of	  individuals	  was	  promoted	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  self-­‐governing	  right	  of	  Quebec	  to	  protect	  
the	   vitality	   of	   the	   French	   language.	  While	   the	   court	  was	   careful	   to	   say	   that	   the	   educational	   pathway	  
would	  need	  to	  be	  genuine	  rather	  than	  artificial,	  in	  reality	  the	  invalidation	  of	  paragraph	  2	  of	  section	  73	  of	  
the	  CFL	  granted	  the	  economic	  right	  for	  individuals	  to	  buy	  their	  children	  and	  generations	  to	  come	  a	  legal	  
status	   as	   a	   member	   of	   one	   of	   Canada’s	   official	   linguistic	   minority	   community.	   Nguyen	   therefore	  
undeniably	  increased	  the	  possibility	  of	  language	  substitution	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  English	  and	  took	  from	  the	  
Quebec	   government	   a	   policy	   tool	   that	   would	   have	   been	   helpful	   in	   integrating	   new	   comers	   into	   the	  
French	  public	  culture.	  
	  
Even	   though	   some,	   like	   the	   Leader	   of	   the	   Official	   Opposition	   Pauline	   Marois,	   summoned	   the	  
government	  to	  invoke	  the	  notwithstanding	  clause	  in	  response	  to	  Nguyen,	  the	  government	  could	  not	  do	  
so	  since	  section	  23	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  it.	  Having	  no	  other	  option,	  Quebec	  was	  constrained	  to	  comply	  with	  
the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  judgment.	  The	  Charest	  government	  thus	  adopted	  An	  Act	  following	  upon	  the	  court	  
decisions	  on	  the	  language	  of	  instruction,	  2010,113	  also	  known	  as	  “Bill	  115.”	  Bill	  115	  essentially	  complied	  
with	  the	  Solski	  and	  Nguyen	  decisions	  by	  allowing	  the	  government	  to	  determine,	  by	  way	  of	   regulation,	  
the	  analytical	  framework	  that	  must	  be	  used	  in	  assessing	  the	  eligibility	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  schools.	  
To	   that	   effect,	   the	   adopted	   regulations	   take	   into	   account	   the	   time	   spent	   in	   an	   unsubsidized	   English	  
school	   in	  assessing	  the	  educational	  pathway	  of	  students.114	  Even	  though	  Bill	  115	  considered	   illegal	   the	  
setting-­‐up	   or	   the	   operatorship	   of	   an	   educational	   establishment	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   circumventing	   the	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principle	  of	  French	   instruction,	   the	  new	  regulations	  provide	   that	   three	  years	   spent	   in	  an	  unsubsidized	  
English	   school	   are	   sufficient	   to	   guarantee	   access	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   school.	   In	   2012,	   Pauline	  
Marois	  ran	  on	  the	  promise	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  “bridging	  schools,”	  but	  during	  its	  term	  in	  government,	  
the	  Parti	  québécois	  failed	  to	  propose	  legislation	  on	  the	  matter.	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  






An	   analysis	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court's	   Charter-­‐based	   review	   of	   the	   CFL	   reveals	   that	   Quebec	   is	  
increasingly	   losing	   relevance	   in	   the	   constitutional	   politics	   of	   language.	   In	   all	   its	   judgments,	   the	   Court	  
unanimously	   secured	   the	   group-­‐differentiated	   rights	   of	   the	  Anglophone	  minority	   and	   increasingly	   the	  
rights	  of	   individual	  Allophones	  and	  Francophones,	  against	   the	  democratic	  will	  of	   the	  Quebec	  majority.	  
Even	  in	  Gosselin,	  which	  favoured	  the	  Quebec	  government,	  the	  main	  justification	  given	  for	  the	  decision	  
was	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   linguistic	   minorities	   rather	   than	   protecting	   French-­‐Quebeckers’	   collective	  
interest.	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  three	  factors:	  the	  move	  towards	  an	  implacable	  parallel	  








This	   preference	   for	   Anglo-­‐Quebeckers	   group	   rights	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	   “constitutional	  
parallelism”	   approach	   the	   Court	   has	   adopted	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	  minority	   language	  
rights.115	  This	  approach	  consists	  of	  treating	  linguistic	  minorities	  equally	  regardless	  of	  their	  official	  spoken	  
language.	  Section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter	  specifically	  refers	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  provincial	  linguistic	  minorities	  
-­‐	  namely	  Francophones	  outside	  Quebec	  and	  Anglophones	  inside	  Quebec	  -­‐	  and	  not	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  
French,	  which	   is	  a	  minority	   language	   in	  Canada	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	   latter	  would	  warrant	  an	  asymmetrical	  
treatment	  of	  linguistic	  minorities	  which,	  in	  practice,	  would	  entail	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  Francophones	  
outside	  Quebec	  and	  protecting	  the	  use	  of	  French	  in	  Quebec,	  even	  if	  it	  meant	  limiting	  the	  rights	  of	  other	  
linguistic	  minorities	  within	   that	   province.	   Although	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   constitutional	   parallelism	   can	   be	  
justified	  by	   the	  very	  wording	  and	  structure	  of	   the	   linguistic	   rights	  provisions	   found	   in	   the	  Charter,	   the	  
Supreme	   Court's	   reliance	   on	   this	   principle	   as	   a	   method	   of	   interpretation	   has	   become	   increasingly	  
important.	   In	   interpreting	  minority	   language	  educational	   rights,	   the	  Court	   seems	   to	  have	  been	  mainly	  
concerned	  with	   the	   situation	   of	   Francophones	   outside	  Quebec	   and	   how	   its	   jurisprudence	   on	   the	   CFL	  
may	   affect	   it,	   rather	   than	   with	   the	   lot	   of	   French	   in	   Quebec.	   To	   better	   understand	   why,	   recent	  
jurisprudence	  needs	  to	  be	  read	   in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  minority-­‐language	  case	   law	  outside	  Quebec,	  
notably	  Abbey	  v.	  Essex	  County	  Board	  of	  Education116	  and	  Whittington	  v.	  Saanich	  Sch.	  Dist.	  63.117	  
	  
In	  Abbey,	  the	  Abbey	  children	  did	  not	  qualify	  for	  minority	  language	  education	  under	  section	  23(1)	  of	  
the	  Charter.	  Their	  mother	  Susan	  Abbey	  had	  English	  as	  her	  first	   language	  and	  had	  received	  her	  primary	  
school	  education	  in	  English.	  Nicholas	  Abbey,	  the	  eldest	  son,	  had	  nonetheless	  attended	  a	  French	  minority	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115See	  especially	  Carolyn	  J	  Tuohy,	  Policy	  and	  Politics	  in	  Canada:	  Institutionalized	  Ambivalence	  (Philadelphia:	  Temple	  
UniversityPress,	  1992);	  Claude	  Ryan,	  “L'impact	  de	  la	  Charte	  canadienne	  des	  droits	  et	  libertés	  sur	  les	  droits	  
linguistiques	  au	  Québec”(2003)	  Numéro	  spécial	  R	  du	  B	  543.	  
1161999	  ONCA	  3693,	  42	  OR	  (3d)	  481	  [Abbey	  cited	  to	  ONCA].	  
1171987	  2642	  BCSC,	  44	  DLR	  (4th)	  128	  [Whittington	  cited	  to	  ONCA].	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school	  pursuant	  to	  the	  decision	  of	  an	  admissions	  committee.118	  Thanks	  to	  section	  23(2),	  his	  siblings	  had	  
also	   been	   able	   to	   attend	   a	   French	   minority	   school.	   When	   the	   family	   moved	   from	   London	   to	   Essex	  
County,	  the	  children	  were	  denied	  access	  to	  minority	   language	  instruction	  by	  the	  local	  school	  board	  on	  
the	  basis	   that	  they	  did	  not	  originally	  qualify	   for	   it	  under	  section	  23(1).	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  of	  Ontario	  
found	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   Abbey	   family	   by	   declaring	   that	   section	   23(2)	   extends	   to	   parents	   who	   are	   not	  
necessarily	  connected	  linguistically	  and/or	  culturally	  to	  the	  linguistic	  minority	  group	  of	  their	  province	  of	  
residence.	  It	  also	  decided	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  section	  23(2)	  rights	  was	  not	  conditional	  on	  interprovincial	  
migration.	  As	  Justice	  Abella	  explained:	  
	  
For	   purposes	   of	   s.	   23(2),	   it	   does	   not	  matter	   whether	   this	   prior	   language	   instruction	   originated	   in	  
another	   province,	   another	   part	   of	   a	   province,	   or	   through	   the	   kind	   of	   admissions	   committee	  
contemplated	  by	  the	  Education	  Act.	  However	  it	  originated,	  it	  is	  the	  fact	  of	  it	  having	  occurred	  which	  
attracts	  the	  protection	  of	  s.	  23(2).119 
	  
Justice	  Abella	  sympathised	  with	  Francophone	  minorities'	  desire	  to	  grow	  their	  ranks	  with	  individuals	  who	  
may	  not	  have	   initially	  a	   cultural	   and	   linguistic	   connection	   to	   them.120	  She	   recognized	   that	   “[t]he	  more	  
fluency	   there	   is	   in	   Canada's	   official	   languages,	   the	   more	   opportunity	   there	   is	   for	   minority	   language	  
groups	  to	  flourish	   in	  the	  community.”121	  By	  confirming	  the	  Abbey	  decision	   in	  Solski	  and	  Nguyen,	  albeit	  
without	  explicitly	  referencing	  it,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  showed	  its	  preference	  for	  the	  well-­‐being	  
of	   provincial	   minorities	   over	   provincial	   majorities.	   If	   it	   had	   ruled	   in	   favour	   of	   Quebec,	   it	   would	   have	  
endangered	  the	  future	  vitality	  of	  Francophone	  minorities	  outside	  Quebec.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118Section	  289	  of	  the	  Education	  Act,	  RSO	  1990,	  c	  E2	  provides	  that	  Ontarian	  minority	  language	  schools	  can	  admit	  
pupils	  that	  do	  not	  qualify	  under	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter.	  
119Abbey,	  supra	  note	  116	  at	  para	  25.	  
120José	  Woerhling,	  “La	  contestation	  judiciaire	  de	  la	  politique	  linguistique	  du	  Québec	  en	  matière	  de	  langue	  
d'enseignement”	  (2005)	  44	  Revista	  de	  Llengua	  101	  at	  122	  [Woerhling,	  “Contestation	  Judiciaire”].	  




	   Increasing	   enrolment	   in	   minority	   language	   schools	   can	   be	   highly	   beneficial	   for	   Francophone	  
minorities;	   a	   greater	   number	   of	   pupils	   can	   help	   attain	   the	   sufficient	   number	   to	   warrant	   the	   right	   to	  
instruction	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  minority	  in	  certain	  areas	  under	  section	  23(3)	  of	  the	  Charter,	  and	  justify	  	  
more	   funding	   for	   existing	   educational	   facilities.122	  However,	   opening	   the	   doors	   of	   minority	   language	  
schools	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  linguistic	  majority	  can	  turn	  these	  into	  assimilation	  centers.	  Therefore,	  the	  
Supreme	   Court	   was	   careful	   to	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	   increasing	   enrolment	   and	   preventing	  
assimilation.	   In	   Gosselin,	   the	   main	   justification	   given	   to	   disallow	   freedom	   of	   choice	   with	   regards	   to	  
language	  of	   instruction	   in	  Quebec	  was	   the	  need	   to	  protect	   linguistic	  minorities.	   That	  members	  of	   the	  
Anglo-­‐Quebec	   community	   would	   assimilate	   into	   the	   French	   majority,	   were	   freedom	   of	   choice	  
sanctioned,	  seems	  however	  questionable	  considering	  the	  assimilating	  force	  of	  English	  in	  North	  America.	  
Before	  Bill	  22,	  when	  freedom	  of	  choice	  existed	  in	  Quebec,	  Anglophones	  were	  certainly	  not	  assimilated.	  
The	  Supreme	  Court's	  concern	  for	  assimilation	  only	  makes	  sense	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Francophones	  outside	  
Quebec.	   Its	   decision	   in	   Gosselin	   does,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   refer	   directly	   to	   Abbey	   to	   support	   the	  
argument	  that	  freedom	  of	  choice	  does	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  purpose	  of	  section	  23.123	  
 
	   Though	   the	  Supreme	  Court's	  desire	   to	  prevent	  assimilation	  of	  Francophone	  minorities	  did	  not	  
play	   in	   Quebec's	   disfavour	   in	   Gosselin,	   it	   did	   so	   in	   Solski.	   Here,	   the	   justices	   specified	   that	   French	  
immersion	  programs	  do	  not	  qualify	  as	  minority	  language	  education	  under	  section	  23(2)	  of	  the	  Charter.	  
By	  doing	  so,	  they	  were	  confirming	  the	  decision	  made	  in	  Whittington,	  again	  without	  explicitly	  referencing	  
it.	   In	   this	   case,	   parents	  whose	   children	   had	   received	   education	   in	   a	   French	   immersion	   program	  were	  
claiming	   the	   right	   to	   have	   all	   their	   children	   instructed	   in	   French-­‐language	   minority	   schools.	   In	   its	  
decision,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  British	  Columbia	  stated	  that	  a	  French	  immersion	  program	  cannot	  qualify	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122Woerhling,	  Contestation	  Judiciaire,	  supra	  note	  120	  at	  123.	  
123Gosselin,	  supra	  note	  7	  at	  para	  30.	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as	  minority	   language	  education	  because	  “[i]n	   that	  programme	  French	   is	   taught	  as	  a	   second	   language,	  
recognizing	  English	  as	  the	  primary	  or	  first	  language.”124	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  corroborated	  this	  
idea	  and	  added	  that	  an	  important	  “cultural	  element”125	  was	  involved	  in	  minority	  language	  education.	  As	  
it	  had	  affirmed	  in	  Mahe,	  “minority	  schools	  themselves	  provide	  community	  centres	  where	  the	  promotion	  
and	  preservation	  of	  minority	  language	  culture	  can	  occur;	  they	  provide	  needed	  locations	  where	  the	  minority	  
community	  can	  meet	  and	  facilities	  which	  they	  can	  use	  to	  express	  their	  culture.”126	  To	  recognize	  attendance	  
in	  a	  French	  immersion	  program	  as	  a	  ticket	  to	  French	  minority	  language	  education	  would	  jeopardise	  the	  
future	  cultural	  unity	  of	  Francophone	  minority	  schools.	  This	  reasoning	  resulted	  in	  widening	  the	  criteria	  of	  
eligibility	  to	  Anglophone	  minority	  school	  in	  cases	  like	  that	  of	  Shanning	  Casimir	  who	  had	  attended	  French	  
immersion	  in	  Ontario	  prior	  to	  moving	  to	  Quebec. 
	  
The	  use	  of	   the	   limitation	  clause	  found	   in	  section	  1	  of	   the	  Charter	  has	  been	   identified	  as	  a	  way	  to	  
transcend	   the	   symmetry	   associated	   with	   language	   rights,	   to	   simultaneously	   promote	   Francophone	  
minorities	   and	   French	   within	   Quebec,127	  yet,	   constitutional	   parallelism	   has	   increasingly	   guided	   the	  
Supreme	  Court's	  section	  1	  analysis.	  In	  the	  earlier	  jurisprudence,	  the	  necessity	  for	  Quebec	  to	  preserve	  its	  
French	   culture	   was	   recognized	   under	   the	   limitation	   clause.	   In	   Ford,	   the	   requirement	   for	   unilingual	  
French	  public	  signs	  could	  not	  be	  saved	  under	  section	  1,	  but	  the	  justices	  allowed	  for	  the	  predominance	  of	  
French	   in	   public	   signage,	   due	   to	   Quebec's	   particular	   linguistic	   situation.128	  It	   is	   unlikely	   that	   such	   a	  
decision	  would	  have	  been	  rendered	  outside	  Quebec.	  There	  is	  simply	  no	  substantial	  and	  pressing	  need	  to	  
have	  a	  mandatory	  use	  of	  English	  in	  public	  signage.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124Whittington,	  supra	  note	  117	  at	  para	  33.	  
125Solski,	  supra	  note	  8	  at	  para	  50.	  
126Mahe,	  supra	  note	  96	  at	  363.	  
127Michel	  Bastarache,	  “Asymmetrical	  Federalism	  and	  Official	  Languages”	  delivered	  at	  the	  McLachlin	  Court’s	  First	  
Decade:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Past	  and	  Projections	  for	  the	  Future	  conference,	  June	  19	  2009	  [online:	  The	  Canadian	  Bar	  
Association	  <http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/PDF/Constit09_Bastarache_paper.pdf>];	  Woerhling,	  Contestation	  
Judiciaire,	  supra	  note	  120.	  




In	   its	   more	   recent	   jurisprudence,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   recognized	   the	   need	   for	   a	   certain	  
asymmetrical	  treatment	  of	  language	  rights,	  but	  to	  no	  avail.	  The	  Court	  established	  in	  Solski	  that,	  despite	  
its	  uniform	  approach	   to	   linguistic	   rights,	   the	  socio-­‐historical	   context	  of	  each	  province	  had	   to	  be	   taken	  
into	  account	  when	  implementing	  those	  rights	  under	  section	  1.129	  However,	  since	  the	  justices	  upheld	  the	  
constitutionality	  of	   the	  CFL	  by	   reading	  down	   its	   section	  73(2),	   it	  avoided	  submitting	   the	  mathematical	  
approach	  to	  the	  “major	  part”	  requirement	  to	  a	  section	  1	  analysis.	  This	  prevented	  Quebec	  from	  using	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  justify	  a	  limitation	  of	  rights	  guaranteed	  by	  section	  23(2)	  of	  the	  Charter.	  Finally,	  the	  Court	  
could	   have	   showed	   more	   concerns	   in	   Nguyen	   for	   Quebec's	   unique	   context	   under	   section	   1.	   The	  
worrisome	   phenomenon	   of	   “bridging	   schools”	   has	   not	   been	   witnessed	   in	   the	   ROC.	   Ultimately,	   the	  
justices	  did	  not	  save	  the	  impugned	  provisions	  of	  Bill	  104	  under	  the	  limitation	  clause,	  even	  though	  there	  
was	   interpretative	   space	   for	   such	   a	   constitutional	   reading.	   The	   “proportionality’’	   requirement	   of	   the	  
Oakes	   test	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   fatal	   to	  Quebec’s	   claim	   of	   reasonably	   limiting	   language	   rights	   in	   this	  
case.	  
	  
B.	  A	  Redefinition	  of	  Official	  Linguistic	  Minority	  Rights	  
	  
Official	   minority	   linguistic	   rights	   have	   been	   significantly	   redefined	   since	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	  
Charter,	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   Quebec.	   More	   specifically,	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	  
Canada	   has	   given	   way	   to	   the	   individualisation	   of	   the	   educational	   rights	   found	   in	   section	   23	   of	   the	  
Charter.	  Originally,	  minority	  educational	  rights	  had	  been	  constitutionally	  enshrined	  to	  protect	  Canada's	  
historic	  linguistic	  minorities.130	  Although	  Prime	  Minister	  Pierre-­‐Elliott	  Trudeau	  had	  a	  clear	  preference	  for	  
the	  adoption	  of	  the	   individual	   freedom	  of	  choice	   in	  education,	  he	  soon	  realised	  that	   it	  would	  not	  rally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129Solski,	  supra	  note	  8	  at	  para	  21.	  
130Proulx,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  46.	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support	  in	  Quebec	  as	  Quebec	  was	  scared	  that	  for	  economic	  reasons,	  such	  a	  principle	  would	  encourage	  
members	  of	  the	  Francophone	  majority	  and	  of	  the	  Allophone	  minority	  to	  choose	  to	  have	  their	  children	  
educated	  in	  English.	  Trudeau	  consequently	  opted	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  official	  language	  minority	  group	  
rights,	  which	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  of	  Quebec.	  The	  intent	  of	  Trudeau	  is	  made	  clear	  in	  this	  
governmental	  statement	  explaining	  the	  nature	  of	  minority	  educational	  rights	  in	  the	  1980	  constitutional	  
package:	  
	  
This	  constitutional	  right	  to	  choose	  would	  not	  apply	  to	  non-­‐citizens,	  or	  to	  citizens	  who	  belong	  to	  the	  
official	   language	  majority	  population	  of	  the	  province.	  Thus	  a	  province	  would	  remain	  free	  to	  place	  
the	  children	  of	  immigrants	  in	  the	  majority	  language	  school	  system	  of	  the	  province	  and	  to	  require	  
children	  who	  are	  members	  of	  the	  language	  majority	  of	  that	  province	  to	  receive	  their	  education	  in	  
that	  language.131	  
	  
As	   previously	  mentioned,	   to	   further	   protect	   the	   province	   of	  Quebec’s	   capacity	   to	   channel	   pupils	  
into	  the	  French	  education	  system,	  the	  province	  was	  exempt	  from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  “mother	  tongue	  
clause”	  found	  in	  section	  23(1)(a)	  of	  the	  Charter.	  Therefore,	  the	  application	  of	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  
Quebec	  principally	  targeted	  the	  historic	  Quebec	  Anglo-­‐community.	  Most	  children	  who	  had	  a	  guaranteed	  
right	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  instruction	  were	  those	  whose	  parents	  had	  received	  instruction	  in	  English	  
in	   Quebec,	   and	   thus	   had	   strong	   roots	   in	   the	   historic	   Quebec	   Anglo-­‐community.	   Section	   23(1)(b)	   also	  
gave	  access	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  schools	  to	  those	  children	  whose	  parents	  had	  received	  instruction	  
in	  English	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Canada.	  Though	  the	  latter	  would	  have	  “weaker	  roots”	  to	  the	  historic	  Anglophone	  
community,	  they	  would	  have	  “strong	  roots”	  to	  the	  Canadian	  Anglo-­‐community	  and	  their	  integration	  in	  
Quebec’s	  historic	  Anglo-­‐community	  would	  be	  organic,	  considering	  the	  natural	  tie	  that	  binds	  the	  English	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131Canada,	  The	  Canadian	  Constitution	  1980:	  Explanation	  of	  a	  Proposed	  Resolution	  Respecting	  the	  Constitution	  of	  
Canada	  (Ottawa:	  Publications	  Canada,	  1980)	  at	  15.	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community	   outside	  Quebec	   and	  Anglo-­‐Quebeckers.	   Children	  without	   “strong	   roots”	   in	   the	  Quebec	  or	  
Canadian	   Anglo-­‐community	   could	   exceptionally	   gain	   access	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   instruction	   via	  
section	  23(2).	  This	  provision’s	  initial	  draft	  however	  made	  continuity	  of	  education	  for	  linguistic	  minorities	  
conditional	  on	   interprovincial	  migration.132	  It	  provided	   that	  Allophone	  or	   Francophone	  pupils	   that	  had	  
attended	  English	  school	  outside	  Quebec	  would	  subsequently	  be	  able	  to	  attend	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  
education	   in	   Quebec,	   but	   not	   those	   who	   had	   spent	   a	   certain	   period	   of	   time	   in	   the	   Quebec	   private	  
English	   education	   system.	   Therefore,	   section	   23(2)	   children’s	   integration	   in	   Quebec’s	   historic	   Anglo-­‐
community	  would	  also	  be	  organic,	  rather	  than	  deliberate	  and	  artificial.	  
	  
However,	   the	   condition	   of	   interprovincial	   migration	   in	   section	   23(2)	   was	   removed	   in	   the	   final	  
constitutional	  package	  of	  1982	  at	  the	  request	  of	  liberal	  senator	  Pietro	  Rizzuto	  and	  the	  National	  Congress	  
of	  Italian-­‐Canadians.133	  As	  amended,	  the	  provision	  states	  that	  “Citizens	  of	  Canada	  of	  whom	  any	  child	  has	  
received	  or	  is	  receiving	  primary	  or	  secondary	  school	  instruction	  in	  English	  or	  French	  in	  Canada,	  have	  the	  
right	   to	   have	   all	   their	   children	   receive	   primary	   and	   secondary	   school	   instruction	   in	   the	   same	  
language.”134	  In	  demanding	   this	   change,	   the	   Italian	  community	  was	  pursuing	   two	  objectives.135	  First,	   it	  
wanted	   to	   constitutionalise	   the	   acquired	   rights	   of	   Allophones	   in	   Quebec.136	  Paragraphs	   c)	   and	   d)	   of	  
section	   73	   of	   the	   CFL	   allowed	   Allophones	  who	  were	   enrolled	   in	   an	   English	   school	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  
passage	   of	   the	   CFL	   to	   maintain	   their	   enrolment,	   regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   their	   parents	   had	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132Section	  23(2)of	  the	  proposed	  resolution	  respecting	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Canada	  reads	  as	  follows:	  
Where	  a	  citizen	  of	  Canada	  changes	  residence	  from	  one	  province	  to	  another	  and,	  prior	  to	  that	  change,	  any	  
child	  of	  that	  citizen	  has	  been	  receiving	  his	  or	  her	  primary	  school	  instruction	  in	  either	  English	  or	  French,	  
that	  citizen	  has	  the	  right	  to	  have	  any	  or	  all	  of	  his	  or	  her	  children	  receive	  their	  primary	  and	  secondary	  
school	  instruction	  in	  the	  same	  language	  if	  the	  number	  of	  citizens	  resident	  in	  the	  area	  of	  which	  the	  citizen	  
has	  moved,	  who	  have	  the	  right	  recognized	  by	  this	  section,	  is	  sufficient	  to	  warrant	  the	  provision	  out	  of	  
public	  funds	  of	  minority	  language	  educational	  facilities	  in	  that	  area.	  
Canada,	  The	  Canadian	  Constitution	  1980:	  Proposed	  Resolution	  Respecting	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Canada	  (Ottawa:	  
Publications	  Canada,	  1980).	  
133Proulx,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  155.	  
134Charter,	  supra	  note	  1,	  s	  23(2).	  
135Proulx,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  155-­‐57.	  
136Ibid.	  at	  155.	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received	   instruction	   in	   English	   in	   Quebec.137	  Second,	   the	   Italian	   community	   wanted	   to	   normalise	   the	  
situation	  of	  about	  1500	  pupils,	  mostly	  of	  Italian	  origin,	  who	  were	  illegally	  receiving	  public	  instruction	  in	  
English	   in	   Quebec	   since	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   CFL.138	  Ironically,	   the	   amendment	   of	   section	   23(2)	  
according	   to	   the	   wishes	   of	   the	   Italian	   community	   was	   never	   able	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   of	   illegal	  
instruction	  in	  Quebec.139	  This	  problem	  had	  to	  be	  separately	  addressed	  in	  1986	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  An	  Act	  
respecting	  the	  eligibility	  of	  certain	  children	  for	  instruction	  in	  English,	  also	  known	  as	  Bill	  58.140	  
	  
As	   rewritten,	   section	  23(2)	  opened	   the	  door	   to	  children	  acquiring	  a	   constitutional	   right	   to	  attend	  
public	  minority	  language	  schools	  after	  having	  spent	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time	  in	  an	  unsubsidized	  private	  
minority	  language	  school,	  thereby	  legalising	  the	  concept	  of	  “bridging	  schools.”141	  However,	  no	  available	  
documentation	  shows	   that	   the	  Charter	  drafters	  and	   the	   Italian	  community	  were	  considering	   this	   legal	  
stratagem	   at	   the	   time	   of	   its	   amendment.142	  While,	   the	   goal	   of	   the	   change	   was	   the	   constitutional	  
protection	  of	  the	  acquired	  rights	  of	  Allophones	  in	  Quebec,143	  the	  seeds	  of	  the	  present	  individualisation	  
of	  minority	  educational	  rights	  had	  been	  planted.	  
	  
Though	  the	  rights	  conferred	  by	  section	  23	  were	  couched	  in	  individualist	  terms,144	  they	  were	  initially	  
given	   a	   collective	   meaning	   in	   the	   jurisprudence.	   In	  Mahe,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   had	   determined	   that	  
section	  23’s	   general	   underlying	  purpose	  was	   twofold:	   first,	   the	  preservation	  and	   flourishing	  of	  official	  
language	  minority	   cultures,	   and	   second,	   the	   correction	  of	   past	   injustices	   endured	  by	  official	   language	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  ss	  73(c)-­‐73(d).	  
138Proulx,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  156.	  
139Ibid.	  
140An	  Act	  respecting	  the	  eligibility	  of	  certain	  children	  for	  instruction	  in	  English,	  LQ	  1986,	  c	  46.	  
141Proulx,	  supra	  note	  45	  at	  156.	  	  
142Ibid.	  
143Ibid.	  at	  156-­‐57.	  
144	  The	  exception	  to	  this	  assessment	  would	  be	  section	  23(3)	  which	  posits	  that	  the	  rights	  contained	  in	  sections	  23(1)	  
and	  23(2)	  apply	  only	  “where	  numbers	  warrants,”	  meaning	  minority	  language	  education	  services	  will	  only	  be	  
provided	  where	  there	  exists	  a	  significant	  minority	  language	  community.	  See	  Patrick	  Monahan,	  “Politics”,	  supra	  
note	  3	  at	  112.	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minorities.145	  As	   per	   Chief	   Justice	   Dickson,	   “[s]ection	   23	   confers	   upon	   a	   group	   a	   right	   which	   places	  
positive	   obligations	   on	   government	   to	   alter	   or	   develop	   major	   institutional	   structures	   [emphasis	  
added].”146	  The	   constitutional	   objective	   pursued	   by	   minority	   educational	   rights	   informed	   subsequent	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  outside	  Quebec	  section	  23(1)	  jurisprudence,147	  as	  well	  as	  lower	  courts	  outside	  
Quebec	   section	   23(2)	   jurisprudence.148	  Quebec	   had	   no	   problem	   guaranteeing	   its	   historic	   Anglophone	  
community	  collective	  group	  rights	  and	  section	  23	  extended	  to	  Francophones	  outside	  Quebec	  somewhat	  
similar	   rights	   Anglophone	   Quebeckers	   already	   enjoyed	   under	   the	   CFL.	   However,	   the	   recognition	   of	  
purely	   individual	   rights	  under	  section	  23	  of	   the	  Charter	   in	  Solski	  and	  Nguyen	  were	  seen	  by	  Quebec	  as	  
more	  problematic.	  
	  
In	  Solski,	  the	  Court	  changed	  its	  understanding	  of	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter	  rights	  by	  asserting	  that	  
they	  were	  primarily	  individualistic	  in	  nature:	  
	  
Section	   23	   is	   clearly	  meant	   to	   protect	   and	   preserve	   both	   official	   languages	   and	   the	   cultures	   they	  
embrace	  throughout	  Canada;	   its	  application	  will	  of	  necessity	  affect	  the	  future	  of	  minority	   language	  
communities.	  	   Section	   23	   rights	   are	   in	   that	   sense	   collective	   rights.	  	   The	   conditions	   for	   their	  
application	   reflect	   this	   (Doucet-­‐Boudreau,	   at	   para.	   28):	   implementation	   depends	   on	   numbers	   of	  
qualified	  pupils	   (Mahe,	   at	  pp.	  366-­‐67;	  Reference	   re	  Public	   Schools	  Act	   (Man.),	   at	  p.	  850;	  Arsenault-­‐
Cameron,	   at	   para.	   32).	   Nevertheless,	   these	   rights	   are	   not	   primarily	   described	   as	   collective	   rights,	  
even	  though	  they	  presuppose	  that	  a	  language	  community	  is	  present	  to	  benefit	  from	  their	  exercise.	  A	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145Mahe,	  supra	  note	  96.	   	  
146Mahe,	  supra	  note	  96	  at	  365.	  
147Reference	  re	  Public	  Schools	  Act	  (Man),	  s	  79(3),	  (4)	  and	  (7),	  [1993]	  1	  SCR	  839,	  100	  DLR	  (4th)	  723	  [Public	  Schools	  
Act	  cited	  to	  scr];	  Arsenault-­‐Cameron	  v	  Prince	  Edward	  Island,	  2000	  SCC	  1,	  [2000]	  1	  SCR	  3.	  
148Abbey,	  supra	  note	  116	  .	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close	  attention	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  s.	  23	  reveals	  individual	  rights	  in	  favour	  of	  persons	  belonging	  to	  
specific	  categories	  of	  rights	  holders	  [emphasis	  added].149	  
	  
In	   this	   statement,	   the	   Court	   limited	   the	   collective	   aspect	   of	   section	   23	   to	   its	   subsection	   23(3),	  which	  
deals	  with	   the	   number	   of	  minority	   language	   pupils	   needed	   to	  warrant	   the	   establishment	   of	  minority	  
language	   educational	   infrastructure.	   The	   characterization	   of	   subsections	   23(1)	   and	   23(2)	   as	   strict	  
individual	  rights	  is	  a	  new	  phenomenon.150	  The	  reasons	  given	  in	  Solski	  and	  Nguyen	  to	  advocate	  the	  right	  
of	   Allophone	   and	   Francophone	   Quebeckers	   to	   instruction	   in	   the	   language	   of	   the	  minority,	   in	   certain	  
circumstances,	   differed	   greatly	   from	   those	   given	   earlier	   to	   defend	   the	   same	   right	   for	   Francophones	  
outside	  Quebec.	   In	  Solski,	   the	  Court	  asserted	   that	   the	   reason	   for	  being	  of	   the	  “continuity	  of	   language	  
instruction”	   clause	   found	   in	   section	   23(2)	   was	   to	   reward	   an	   individual’s	   “genuine	   commitment	   to	   a	  
minority	   language	   education,” 151 	  rather	   than	   to	   protect	   the	   Anglo-­‐Quebecker	   community. 152	  
Furthermore,	   granting	   eligibility	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   instruction	   to	   children	   of	   Allophones	   and	  
Francophone	  in	  Quebec	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  countering	  assimilation	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Quebecker	  community	  
nor	  does	  it	  redress	  past	  linguistic	  injustices,	  except	  for	  not	  being	  able	  to	  recruit	  new	  members.	  Rather,	  it	  
precludes	  Quebec	  from	  using	  a	  powerful	  policy	  tool	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  its	  French	  public	  culture.	  
	  
C.	  The	  Exhaustion	  of	  Legislative	  Counterattacks	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149Solski,	  supra	  note	  8	  at	  para	  23.	  
150Contra	  Vanessa	  Gruben,	  supra	  note	  42	  at	  117-­‐19.	  Nicolas	  M.	  Rouleau	  believes	  Solski	  depicts	  
subsections	  23(1)	  and	  23(2)	  as	  simultaneously	  individual	  and	  collective:	  “The	  right	  [in	  Section	  23]	  is	  
‘individual’	  because	  it	  allows	  individual	  members	  of	  the	  minority	  to	  fulfill	  their	  personal	  aspirations	  of	  
their	  own	  language.	  The	  right	  is	  ‘collective’	  because	  it	  intends	  to	  promote	  the	  development	  	  of	  minority-­‐
language	  	  communities	  throughout	  Canada	  [...].”	  See	  Nicolas	  M.	  Rouleau,	  “Section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter:	  
Mnority-­‐Language	  Education	  Rights”	  in	  Joseph	  Eliot	  Magnet,	  Official	  Languages	  of	  Canada:	  New	  Essays	  
(Markham:	  LexisNexis,	  2008)	  261	  at	  292-­‐93.	  
151Solski,	  supra	  note	  8	  at	  para	  28.	  
152	  Henri	  Brun,	  “La	  Cour	  suprême	  du	  Canada	  et	  le	  droit	  à	  l'école	  publique	  anglaise	  au	  Québec”	  (2006)	  1	  Bulletin	  
québécois	  de	  droit	  constitutionnel	  18	  at	  21.	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Since	   the	  enactment	  of	   the	  Charter,	   the	  National	  Assembly	  has	  been	   increasingly	  unsuccessful	  at	  
counteracting	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court's	   jurisprudence	   on	   the	   CFL	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   and	  
promote	   the	   French	   language	   in	   Quebec.	   To	   start,	   Quebec	   has	   not	   been	   able	   to	   rely	   on	   the	  
notwithstanding	   clause.	   Because	   the	   provincial	   language	   policy	   was	   predominantly	   challenged	   under	  
section	  23	  pertaining	  to	  educational	  rights,	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  rights	  violation	  by	  the	  judiciary	  could	  
not	   be	   overturned	   constitutionally	   with	   the	   derogatory	   clause.	   In	   Ford,	   the	   only	   case	   in	   which	   the	  
notwithstanding	  clause	  was	  available,	  its	  use	  was	  found	  to	  be	  politically	  non	  viable	  in	  the	  long-­‐run.	  The	  
unavailability	   of	   the	   notwithstanding	   clause	   has	   forced	   the	   Quebec	   government	   to	   show	   legislative	  
ingenuity	  to	  pursue	  its	  linguistic	  goals,	  especially	  in	  the	  area	  of	  education.	  
	  
A	  soon	  as	  the	  “Canada	  clause”	  was	  adopted	  in	  1982,	  the	  Quebec	  government	  understood	  that	  the	  
“Quebec	   clause”	   would	   not	   withstand	   a	   constitutional	   challenge.	   Even	   before	   it	   was	   struck	   down	   in	  
Quebec	   Protestant	   School	   Boards,	   the	   government	   of	   René	   Lévesque	   made	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
“Canada	   clause”	   conditional	   on	   the	   implementation	   on	  minority	   language	   education	   infrastructure	   in	  
other	  provinces.153	  If	  the	  government	  was	  not	  able	  to	  safeguard	  the	  “Quebec	  clause,”	  it	  wished	  to	  help	  
the	   vitality	   of	   French	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   country.	   Eventually,	   the	   early	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   Court	  
invalidated	  this	  controversial	  CFL	  provision	  for	  which	  there	  was	  no	  cross-­‐party	  consensus	  at	  the	  National	  
Assembly.	   This	   legal	   defeat	   was	   somewhat	   easy	   to	   swallow	   for	   the	   Parti	   Québecois,	   as	   Quebec	  
maintained	  the	  capacity	  to	  successfully	  integrate	  Allophones	  into	  French	  public	  culture.	  
	  
The	  successive	  addition	  of	  the	  “major	  part	  requirement”	  to	  section	  23(1)(b)154	  and	  section	  23(2)155	  
also	   helped	   Quebec	   in	   its	   quest	   to	   francize	   Allophones.	   Thought	   it	   was	   initially	   adopted	   in	   view	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1983	  c	  56,	  s	  86.1.	  
154CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1983,	  c	  56,	  s	  73(a).	  
155CFL,	  supra	  note	  30,	  as	  amended	  by	  SQ	  1993,	  c	  40,	  s	  73(1).	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widening	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  school	  for	  Anglophones,	  it	  also	  had	  the	  effect	  
of	  guaranteeing	  that	  those	  eligible	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  schools	  would	  have	  a	  sufficient	  connection	  
to	   the	   English	  minority,	  whether	   it	   be	   through	   their	   own	   education,	   that	   of	   their	   siblings	   or	   parents.	  
Though	   this	   legal	   measure	   was	   read	   down	   in	   Solski	   with	   the	   imposition	   of	   the	   “significant	   part	  
requirement,”	   Quebec's	   goal	   of	   preventing	   many	   members	   of	   the	   Francophone	   majority	   and	   the	  
Allophone	  minority	   from	   artificially	   gaining	   access	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   schools	  was	  maintained.	  
Thanks	  to	  the	  earlier	  introduction	  of	  Bill	  104,	  time	  spent	  in	  an	  unsubsidized	  English	  school	  would	  not	  be	  
taken	   into	   account	   in	   determining	   eligibility	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   schools.	   Bill	   104	   also	   provided	  
that	  both	  the	  time	  spent	  at	  the	  elementary	  level	  and	  the	  secondary	  level	  would	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  
when	  applying	  the	  “major	  part	  requirement.”	  
	  
When	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   invalidated	   the	   new	   measures	   introduced	   by	   Bill	   104	   in	   Nguyen,	   it	  
removed	  from	  Quebec	  government	  an	  important	  policy	  tool	  used	  to	  ensure	  integration	  of	  new	  comers	  
into	  French	  public	  culture.	  The	  Ministère	  de	  l'Éducation,	  du	  Loisir	  et	  du	  Sport	  revealed	  that	  the	  number	  
of	   children	   eligible	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   education	   subsequent	   to	   an	   attendance	   in	   a	   non-­‐
subsidised	  English	  school	  went	  from	  628	  in	  1998	  to	  1379	  in	  2002.156	  According	  to	  demographer	  Robert	  
Maheu's	  conservative	  estimate,	  this	  number	  would	  have	  reached	  11	  000	  in	  2009,	  which	  amounts	  to	  10%	  
of	   the	   total	  population	  of	  public	  English	   schools	   in	  Québec.157	  These	   figures	  are	  more	  worrisome	  than	  
those	   to	  which	   the	  Court	   referred	   to	   in	  Nguyen.158	  Though	  Bill	   115	  now	  outlaws	   “bridging-­‐schools”,	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156Robert	  Maheu,	  “Table	  ronde	  2009:	  Le	  jugement	  de	  la	  Cour	  suprême	  sur	  la	  loi	  104	  (partie	  II)”delivered	  at	  the	  
Centre	  St-­‐Pierre,	  11	  November	  2009	  [online:	  Institut	  de	  recherche	  sur	  le	  français	  en	  
Amérique<http://irfa.ca/table2009_1.html>].	  
157Ibid.	  
158Nguyen,	  supra	  note	  9	  at	  para	  42:	  “For	  example,	  in	  the	  2001-­‐2	  school	  year,	  according	  to	  statistics	  provided	  by	  the	  
Ministère	  de	  l’Éducation	  for	  the	  entire	  province	  of	  Quebec,	  just	  over	  2,100	  students	  enrolled	  in	  English-­‐language	  
UPSs	  at	  the	  pre-­‐school,	  elementary	  and	  secondary	  levels	  throughout	  Quebec	  did	  not	  have	  certificates	  of	  eligibility	  
for	  instruction	  in	  English	  (A.R.,	  at	  p.	  1605).	  	  Thus,	  before	  Bill	  104	  came	  into	  force,	  the	  time	  they	  spent	  in	  these	  
institutions	  could	  have	  qualified	  them	  for	  a	  transfer	  to	  the	  publicly-­‐funded	  English-­‐language	  system.	  	  This	  
represents	  just	  over	  1.5	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  students	  eligible	  for	  instruction	  in	  English	  that	  year	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still	  allows	  members	  of	   the	  Francophone	  majority	  and	  of	   the	  Allophone	  minority	   to	  buy	  their	  children	  
and	   their	   descendants,	   a	   right	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   schooling.	   This	   constitutional	   loophole	   will	  
undeniably	   increase	   language	   substitution	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	   English	   in	   Quebec,	   especially	   among	  
members	  of	  the	  Allophone	  minority,	  who	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  cutting	  all	  significant	  contact	  with	  the	  French	  
language.159	  For	  most	  Allophones	   living	   in	  the	  Montreal	  metropolitan	  area,	  where	  English	  continues	  to	  
be	  a	  greater	  assimilating	  force	  than	  French,160	  integration	  into	  the	  majority	  public	  culture	  is	  inextricably	  
linked	  to	  enrolment	  in	  French	  institutions161	  or	  that	  of	  their	  children.162	  
	  
The	   analytical	   framework	   introduced	   in	   2010	   to	   determine	   eligibility	   to	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	  
school	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   legally	   challenged	   in	   the	   future.163	  The	   three-­‐year	   minimum	   attendance	   to	   an	  
unsubsidized	  English	  school	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  English	  school	  might	  be	  judicially	  
reduced	  to	  a	  shorter	  period.164	  Considering	  this	  situation,	  what	  legislative	  remedies	  are	  still	  available	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Rapport	  sur	  l’évolution	  de	  la	  situation	  linguistique	  au	  Québec,	  2002-­‐2007,	  at	  p.	  82).	  	  This	  number	  has	  since	  
increased.	  	  The	  number	  of	  students	  attending	  English-­‐language	  UPSs	  who	  did	  not	  have	  certificates	  of	  eligibility	  
exceeded	  4,000	  in	  the	  2007-­‐8	  school	  year	  (A.R.,	  at	  p.	  1605)”.	  
159For	  a	  different	  view,	  see	  James	  B.	  Kelly,	  “Les	  limites	  de	  la	  mobilisation	  judiciaire:	  Alliance	  Québec,	  la	  Charte	  de	  la	  
langue	  française	  et	  la	  Charte	  canadienne	  des	  droits	  et	  libertés”	  in	  François	  Rocher	  &	  Benoît	  Pelletier,	  eds,	  Le	  nouvel	  
ordre	  constitutionnel	  canadien	  du	  rapatriement	  de	  1982	  à	  nos	  jours	  (Quebec	  City:	  Les	  Presses	  de	  l'Université	  du	  
Québec,	  2013)	  at	  227-­‐30.	  Kelly	  argues	  that	  the	  2010	  regulations	  have	  made	  eligibility	  to	  public	  English	  instruction,	  
after	  a	  stay	  in	  the	  English	  private	  system,	  more	  restrictive	  because	  of	  the	  financial	  obstacle	  that	  represent	  the	  
costs	  of	  attending	  private	  English	  school	  for	  three	  years	  and	  the	  discretionary	  nature	  of	  the	  eligibility	  granting	  
process.	  
160Groupe	  de	  travail	  ministériel	  pour	  un	  plan	  d'action	  en	  vue	  de	  promouvoir	  et	  de	  maintenir	  le	  caractère	  français	  
de	  Montréal	  et	  d'assurer	  la	  vitalité	  et	  la	  qualité	  de	  la	  langue	  française	  au	  Québec,	  Les	  défis	  de	  la	  langue	  française	  à	  
Montréal	  et	  au	  Québec	  au	  XXIe	  siècle:	  constats	  et	  enjeux	  (Quebec	  City:	  Gouvernement	  of	  Quebec,	  2000).	  
161See	  e.g.	  Marie	  McAndrew,	  “La	  loi	  101	  en	  milieu	  scolaire:	  Impacts	  et	  résultats”	  (2002)	  Revue	  d'aménagement	  
linguistique,	  Fall	  speciale	  dition,	  69;	  Isabelle	  Beaulieu,	  “Enfants	  de	  la	  loi	  101”	  in	  Michel	  Venne,	  ed,	  L'annuaire	  du	  
Québec	  2004	  (Montreal:	  Fides,	  2003)	  1007.	  
162Seee.g.	  Alain	  Carpentier,	  Tout	  est-­‐il	  joué	  avant	  l'arrivée?	  étude	  de	  facteurs	  associés	  à	  un	  usage	  prédominant	  du	  
français	  ou	  de	  l'anglais	  chez	  les	  immigrants	  allophones	  arrivés	  au	  Québec	  adultes	  (Quebec	  City:	  Conseil	  supérieur	  
de	  la	  langue	  française,	  2004)	  at	  42.	  
163	  See	  Dean	  Ardron,	  “Amendments	  to	  the	  Quebec	  Charter	  of	  the	  French	  Language	  Constitutionally	  Invalid”	  (2009)	  
19	  ELJ	  251;	  Guy	  Régimbald	  &	  Dwight	  Newman,	  The	  Law	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Constitution	  (Markham:	  Lexis	  Nexis,	  2013)	  
at	  709-­‐10.	  
164	  The	  minimum	  would	  likely	  not	  fall	  under	  one	  year.	  In	  Nguyen,	  Justice	  Lebel	  declared	  that	  “it	  might	  be	  thought	  
that	  an	  educational	  pathway	  of	  six	  months	  or	  one	  year	  spent	  at	  the	  start	  of	  elementary	  school	  in	  an	  institution	  
established	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  bridge	  to	  the	  public	  education	  system	  would	  not	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  purposes	  of	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Quebec	   to	   stop	   the	   expected	   turn	   towards	   an	   indirect	   freedom	   of	   choice	   in	   education?	   Two	   main	  
solutions	   have	   been	   put	   forward	   to	   overcome	   this	   legal	   deadlock.	   First,	   some	   have	   argued	   that	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  CFL	  should	  be	  extended	  to	  unsubsidized	  schools.165	  In	  practice,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  
only	  those	  who	  qualify	  for	  minority	  language	  education	  under	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charter	  would	  have	  the	  
right	   to	   attend	   unsubsidized	   English	   school	   in	   Quebec.	   Such	   a	  measure	   could	   easily	   be	   challenged	   in	  
court	  on	   the	  basis	   that	   it	   violates	   the	  spirit	  of	   the	  minority	   language	  educational	   rights	  provision.	  The	  
courts	  could	  argue	  that	  section	  23	  only	  applies	  in	  principle	  to	  publicly-­‐funded	  schools.	  If	  the	  CFL	  is	  to	  be	  
a	   legislative	   articulation	   of	   this	   constitutional	   provision,	   then	   it	   can’t	   limit	   access	   to	   privately-­‐funded	  
schools.	  
	  
The	  second	  proposed	  solution	  consists	  of	  amending	  the	  Canadian	  constitution	  through	  the	  bilateral	  
amendment	   procedure	   found	   in	   section	   43,166	  either	   to	   explicitly	   recognized	   that	   time	   spent	   in	   an	  
unsubsidized	  English	  school	  in	  Quebec	  cannot	  open	  the	  door	  to	  public	  English	  school167	  or	  to	  enshrine	  an	  
interpretative	   clause	   recognizing	   the	   specificity	   of	  Quebec,168	  similar	   to	   the	  ones	   proposed	  during	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
s.	  23(2)	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  and	  the	  interpretation	  given	  to	  that	  provision	  in	  Solski.”	  See	  Nguyen,	  supra	  note	  9	  
at	  para	  44.	  
165José	  Woerhling,	  “Les	  décisions	  de	  la	  Cour	  Suprême	  du	  Canada	  dans	  les	  affaires	  Solski/Casimir	  et	  Gosselin”	  
(2005)	  44	  Revista	  de	  Llenguai	  Dret	  179;	  Robert	  Maheu,	  supra	  note	  156;	  Daniel	  Proulx	  &	  Jean-­‐Pierre	  Proulx,	  
“Jugement	  sur	  la	  loi	  104:	  Imposer	  la	  loi	  101	  aux	  écoles	  privées	  non	  subventionnées”,	  Le	  Devoir	  (11	  November	  
2009)A11;	  Conseil	  supérieur	  de	  la	  langue	  française,	  Avis	  sur	  l'accès	  à	  l'école	  anglaise	  à	  la	  suite	  du	  jugement	  de	  la	  
Cour	  suprême	  du	  22	  octobre	  2009	  (Quebec	  City:	  Conseil	  supérieur	  de	  la	  langue	  française,	  2010)	  at	  40-­‐42.	  
166Constitution	  Act,	  1982,	  being	  Schedule	  B	  to	  the	  Canada	  Act	  1982	  UK,	  1982,	  c	  11	  [Constitution	  Act	  1982],	  s	  43	  
reads	  as	  follows:	  
An	  amendment	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Canada	  in	  relation	  to	  any	  provision	  that	  applies	  to	  one	  or	  
more,	  but	  not	  all,	  provinces,	  including	  
 (a)	  any	  alteration	  to	  boundaries	  between	  provinces,	  and	  
 (b)	  any	  amendment	  to	  any	  provision	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  English	  or	  the	  French	  language	  
within	  a	  province,	  
may	  be	  made	  by	  proclamation	  issued	  by	  the	  Governor	  General	  under	  the	  Great	  Seal	  of	  Canada	  only	  
where	  so	  authorized	  by	  resolutions	  of	  the	  Senate	  and	  House	  of	  Commons	  and	  of	  the	  legislative	  
assembly	  of	  each	  province	  to	  which	  the	  amendment	  applies.	  
167See	  Charles-­‐Emmanuel	  Côté	  &	  Guy	  Tremblay,“Un	  remède	  durable”,	  La	  Presse	  (24	  November2009)	  	  A21;	  Guy	  
Tremblay,	  “La	  portée	  élargie	  de	  la	  procédure	  bilatérale	  de	  modification	  de	  la	  constitution”	  (2011)	  41:2	  RGD	  417.	  
168See	  David	  R	  Cameron	  &	  Jacqueline	  D	  Krikorian,	  supra	  note	  82.	  
47	  
	  
Meech	  and	  Charlottetown	  accords	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  CFL	  from	  future	  attacks.	  It	  is	  unlikely	  however	  
that	   the	   federal	   government	   would	   support	   such	   an	   amendment,	   considering	   the	   history	   of	  
constitutional	   negotiations	   in	   Canada.	   In	   that	   sense,	  Quebec	   seems	   to	   have	   exhausted	   the	   legislative	  
responses	  available	  to	  it	  to	  effectively	  counteract	  the	  Supreme	  Court's	  Charter	  jurisprudence.	  
	  
By	   constantly	   being	   forced	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   Court’s	   judgments,	   Quebec	   accepted	   to	   protect	  
group-­‐differentiated	   rights,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   purely	   individual	   rights,	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   its	   self-­‐
governing	   rights.	  Put	  simply,	   since	   the	  coming	   into	   force	  of	   the	  Charter,	  Quebec	  has	  not	  been	  able	   to	  






By	   determining	   the	   content	   of	   linguistic	   rights,	   the	   courts	   rather	   than	   the	   governments	   have	  
become	  central	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  Canadian	  citizenship.	  By	  constantly	  ruling	  against	  Quebec	  in	  matters	  
of	   language	   policy,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   denied	   the	   province	   its	   historical	   role	   in	   defining	   Canadian	  
cultural	   citizenship.	   Quebec	   has	   contributed	   to	   making	   Canada	   federal	   in	   1867	   and	   later	   officially	  
bilingual	  in	  1969	  by	  its	  political	  claims.	  However,	  the	  new	  constitutional	  order	  has	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  
for	   the	   province	   to	   further	   the	   multinational	   character	   of	   Canadian	   citizenship.	   Instead,	   the	   country	  





This	  phenomenon	  is	  not	  new.	  What	  is	  novel	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  individualisation	  of	  Canadian	  
citizenship	  is	  occurring.	  Pierre	  Elliott	  Trudeau’s	  vision	  of	  an	  undifferentiated	  citizenship	  clearly	  impacted	  
Canada	  with	   the	   entrenchment	   of	   the	  Charter	   in	   1982.169	  Early	   jurisprudence	   in	   the	   area	   of	   linguistic	  
rights	   in	   Quebec	   constituted	   a	   first	   step	   in	   applying	   this	   new	   vision.	   In	   it,	   Anglophones'	   group-­‐
differentiated	  rights,	  which	  are	  exercised	  individually,	  were	  promoted	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  Quebec’s	  self-­‐
governing	  rights.	  Nonetheless,	  Quebec	  retained	  some	  policy	  tools	  to	  preserve	  its	  cultural	  distinctiveness	  
by	   integrating	   immigrants	   into	   the	  French	  educational	   system.	  However,	   recent	  Charter	   jurisprudence	  
challenged	   these	   tools	   by	   recognizing	   the	   purely	   individual	   right	   of	   Allophones	   and	   Francophones	   to	  
indirectly	   access	   publicly-­‐funded	   English	   Quebec	   schools	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   thereby	   increasing	  
language	   substitution	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	   English.	   This	   has	   marked	   an	   even	   blunter	   step	   towards	   an	  
undifferentiated	  citizenship.	  
	  
However,	   Quebec	   has	   a	   justifiable	   claim	   to	   differential	   treatment	   from	   a	   constitutional,	  
jurisprudential	   and	   normative	   perspective. 170 	  To	   begin,	   Canada's	   constitutional	   edifice	   contains	  
asymmetrical	  arrangements	  that	  give	  Quebec	  a	  de	  facto	  special	  status.	  The	  Quebec	  Act,	  1774	  restored	  
the	   use	   of	   the	   civil	   code	   on	   the	   Province	   of	   Quebec's	   territory	   in	   private	   matters	   after	   the	   British	  
Conquest,171	  which	  makes	  modern	  Quebec	  the	  only	  Canadian	  province	  with	  a	  civilian	  legal	  tradition.	  By	  
establishing	   the	   federal	   structure,	   the	   BNAA	   ensured	   Quebec	   would	   be	   the	   only	   province	   with	   a	  
Francophone	  majority.	  The	  BNAA	  also	  provided	   that	  Quebec	  would	  be	   the	  only	  province	   in	  which	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	  See	  Jenson,	  supra	  note	  51;	  Russell,	  supra	  note	  5;	  Daniel	  Weinstock,	  “The	  Moral	  Psychology	  of	  Federalism”	  in	  
Fabien	  Gélinas	  &	  Jean-­‐François	  Gaudreault-­‐DesBiens,	  eds,	  The	  States	  and	  Moods	  of	  Federalism:	  Governance,	  
Identity	  and	  Methodology	  (Cowansville,	  Québec:	  Éditions	  Y.	  Blais,	  2005)	  209.	  
170See	  for	  e.g.	  Benoît	  Pelletier,	  Une	  certaine	  idée	  du	  Québec:	  Parcours	  d'un	  fédéraliste.	  De	  la	  réflexion	  à	  l'action	  
(Sainte-­‐Foy:	  Presses	  de	  l'Université	  Laval,	  2010)	  at	  15-­‐28;	  Henri	  Brun,	  Guy	  Tremblay	  &	  Eugénie	  Brouillet,	  Droit	  
constitutionnel,	  5th	  Ed	  (Cowansville:	  Éditions	  Yvon	  Blais,	  2008)	  at	  890-­‐91.	  
171Quebec	  Act,	  1774,	  14	  Geo	  III	  c	  83.	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use	  of	  French	  and	  English	  in	  the	  legislature	  and	  the	  courts	  is	  constitutionally	  protected.172	  Furthermore,	  
Quebec	   is	   the	  only	  province	   to	  be	  exempted	   from	   the	  mother	   tongue	   clause	   in	   the	   section	  23	  of	   the	  
Charter.173	  
	  
The	   recognition	   of	   a	   differential	   treatment	   for	   Quebec	   also	   has	   a	   jurisprudential	   basis	   when	   it	  
comes	  to	  the	  particular	  case	  of	  minority	  language	  education.	  At	  the	  Quebec	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  level	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Nguyen,	  Justice	  Giroux	  gave	  compelling	  arguments	  as	  to	  why	  part	  of	  Bill	  104	  did	  not	  contravene	  
section	  23(2)	   of	   the	  Charter	   in	   his	  minority	  opinion.174	  Justice	  Giroux	   refused	   to	   literally	   apply	   section	  
23(2),	   thereby	   granting	   to	   a	   child	   the	   right	   to	   public	   minority	   language	   education	   after	   a	   short	   or	  
significant	  stay	  in	  a	  private	  minority	  language	  school,	  and	  preferred	  to	  adopt	  a	  contextual	  interpretation	  
of	  this	  rights	  provision.	  According	  to	  him,	  past	  judgements	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  have	  established	  that	  
the	   interpretation	   of	   section	   23	   should	   take	   into	   account	   the	   specific	   linguistic	   dynamic	   of	   each	  
province 175 	  and	   allow	   for	   different	   solutions	   accordingly. 176 	  Furthermore,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	  
specifically	  mentioned	  that	  the	  linguistic	  concerns	  of	  the	  French	  majority	  in	  Quebec	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  
in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  linguistic	  rights:	  
	  
Rules	  to	  govern	  language	  rights	  [...]	  also	  inevitably	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  how	  Quebec's	  French-­‐speaking	  
community	  perceived	   its	   future	   in	  Canada,	  and	  even	  more	  so	   in	  North	  America	  as	  a	  whole.	  To	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172The	  Manitoba	  Act,	  1879	  later	  protected	  the	  use	  of	  French	  in	  English	  in	  the	  province's	  legislature	  and	  courts.	  See	  
Manitoba	  Act,	  1870,	  RSC	  1970,	  App	  II,	  s	  23.	  In	  1982,	  sections	  16	  to	  22	  of	  the	  Charter	  gave	  French	  and	  English	  the	  
status	  of	  official	  languages	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  government	  of	  New	  Brunswick.	  See	  Charter,	  supra	  note	  1,	  ss	  
16-­‐22.	  
173Constitution	  Act	  1982,	  supra	  note	  166,	  s	  59.	  
174H.N.	  c	  Québec	  (Ministre	  de	  l'Éducation),	  2007	  QCCA	  1111,	  [2007]	  RJQ	  2097,	  at	  para	  235-­‐299.	  
175“[D]ifferent	  interpretative	  approaches	  may	  well	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  different	  jurisdictions,	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
unique	  blend	  of	  linguistic	  dynamics	  that	  have	  developed	  in	  each	  province.”Public	  Schools	  Act,	  supra	  note	  147	  at	  
851;	  “The	  application	  of	  section	  23	  is	  contextual.	  It	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  very	  real	  differences	  between	  
situations	  of	  the	  minority	  language	  	  community	  in	  Quebec	  and	  the	  minority	  language	  communities	  of	  the	  
territories	  and	  the	  provinces.”	  Solski,	  supra	  note	  8	  at	  para	  34.	  
176“If	  the	  problems	  are	  different,	  the	  solutions	  will	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  same”,	  Gosselin,	  supra	  note	  7	  at	  para	  31.	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picture	   must	   be	   added	   the	   serious	   difficulties	   resulting	   from	   the	   rate	   of	   assimilation	   of	   French-­‐
speaking	   groups	   outside	   Quebec,	   whose	   current	   language	   rights	   were	   acquired	   only	   recently,	   at	  
considerable	  expense	  and	  with	  great	  difficulty.	  Thus	   in	   interpreting	   these	   rights,	   the	  courts	  have	  a	  
responsibility	   to	   reconcile	   sometimes	   divergent	   interests	   and	   priorities,	   and	   to	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	  
future	  of	  each	  linguistic	  community.177	  
	  
Considering	   that	   Quebec	   was	   concerned	   with	   the	   integration	   of	   new	   comers	   and	   the	   growing	  
phenomenon	   of	   “bridging	   schools”,	   Justice	   Giroux	   determined	   that	   section	   23	   of	   the	   Charter	   gave	  
Quebec	  the	  necessary	  latitude	  to	  constitutionally	  restrict	  access	  to	  English	  schools.	  
	  
From	   a	   normative	   perspective,	   the	   substantial	   equality	   of	   French	   and	   English	   will	   be	   better	  
achieved	   through	   the	   recognition	   of	   a	   special	   status	   for	   Quebec,	   rather	   than	  with	   the	   application	   of	  
constitutional	  parallelism	  in	  matters	  of	  minority	  language	  education.	  According	  to	  Carolyn	  J.	  Tuohy,	  the	  
legal	  parallel	  treatment	  of	  English	  and	  French	  in	  the	  jurisprudence	  on	  educational	  rights	  originates	  from	  
the	  two	  nations	   founding	  myth.178	  However,	   this	  constitutional	  parallelism	  does	  not	  reflect	  reality;	   the	  
two	  “founding	  nations,”	  namely	  French	  Canadians	  and	  English	  Canadians,	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  on	  equal	  
footing	   demographically	   speaking.179	  Furthermore,	   the	   precarious	   status	   of	   Francophone	   minorities	  
outside	  Quebec	  does	  not	  compare	  to	  that	  of	  the	  established	  special	  status	  of	  the	  Anglophone	  minority	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177Solski,	  supra	  note	  8	  at	  para	  5.	  
178Tuohy,	  supra	  note	  115.	  
17956.9%	  of	  Canadians	  have	  English	  as	  a	  mother	  tongue,	  while	  only	  21.7%	  of	  Canadians	  have	  French	  as	  a	  mother	  
tongue.	  See	  Statistics	  Canada,	  Population	  by	  mother	  tongue	  and	  age	  groups	  (total),	  percentage	  distribution	  (2011),	  






in	   Quebec.	   The	   latter	   can	   be	   qualified	   as	   a	   “dominant	   minority”	   due	   to	   its	   direct	   tie	   to	   the	   English	  
majority	  in	  Canada.180	  
	  
Interestingly,	  all	  the	  rights	  demanded	  by	  Francophones	  outside	  Quebec	  had	  already	  been	  granted	  
to	   Anglo-­‐Quebeckers	   before	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   Charter.	   Quebec	   guaranteed	   access	   to	   publicly-­‐
funded	  English	   instruction	  to	   its	  historical	  Anglophone	  minority,181	  as	  well	  as	  management	  and	  control	  
of	  its	  schools,182	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  numbers	  warrant	  these	  rights	  in	  particular	  geographical	  
areas.	  Furthermore,	  the	  right	  claims	  to	  which	  the	  justices	  responded	  favourably	  in	  Quebec	  to	  the	  dismay	  
of	  the	  majority	  would	  have	  been	  non-­‐issues	  outside	  Quebec	  where	  Anglophones	  do	  not	  feel	  the	  English	  
language	  is	  threatened	  by	  language	  substitution	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  French.	  Thus	  only	  by	  promoting	  French	  
outside	  and	  inside	  Quebec	  will	  it	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  thrive	  in	  Canada.	  
	  
In	  the	  end,	  the	  hopes	  of	  Quebec	  finding	  a	  solution	  to	  it	  not	  having	  a	  special	  status,	  should	  it	  decide	  
to	   stay	  within	   the	  Canadian	   constitutional	  bosom,	  are	   grim.	   The	   reality	  of	  Canadian	  politics	   limits	   the	  
capacity	   of	   stakeholders	   to	   amend	   the	   constitution.183	  Today,	   constitutional	   modification	   is	   mostly	  
achieved	   through	   rights-­‐based	   judicial	   review,	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,	   by	   the	   establishment	   of	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180José	  Woehrling,	  “Minority	  Cultural	  and	  Linguistic	  Rights	  and	  Equality	  Rights	  in	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  
and	  Freedoms”	  (1985)	  31:1	  McGill	  LJ	  50.	  
181CFL,	  supra	  note	  30	  at	  para	  73.Though	  the	  original	  CFL	  required	  protestant	  school	  boards	  to	  use	  French	  in	  their	  
internal	  and	  external	  communications,	  this	  problem	  was	  remedied	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  Bill	  58.	  See	  An	  Act	  
respecting	  the	  eligibility	  of	  certain	  children	  for	  instruction	  in	  English,	  supra	  note	  140.	  
182The	  Quebec	  Anglo-­‐community	  has	  enjoyed	  control	  over	  its	  own	  education	  system	  since	  Confederation	  in	  1867.	  
See	  Garth	  Stevenson,	  Community	  Besieged:	  The	  Anglophone	  Minority	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Quebec	  (Montreal:	  McGill-­‐
Queen's	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  at	  26.	  Though	  the	  original	  CFL	  required	  protestant	  school	  boards	  to	  use	  French	  in	  
their	  internal	  and	  external	  communications,	  this	  problem	  was	  remedied	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  Bill	  58.	  See	  An	  Act	  
respecting	  the	  eligibility	  of	  certain	  children	  for	  instruction	  in	  English,	  supra	  note	  140.	  
183See	  especially	  Allan	  Cairns,	  Charter	  Versus	  Federalism:	  The	  Dilemmas	  of	  Constitutional	  Reform	  (Montreal	  and	  
Kingston:	  McGill-­‐Queen's	  University	  Press,	  1992);	  Christophe	  P	  Manfredi	  &	  Michael	  Lusztig,	  “Why	  Do	  Formal	  




conventions.	  Thus,	  as	  it	  stands,	  Quebec	  must	  accept	  that	  it	  has	  lost	  some	  relevance	  in	  the	  constitutional	  
politics	  of	  language.	  
	  
	  
